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I. INTRODUCTION 
From the mid-1990s through 2008, the United States experienced 
the biggest booms and busts in its securities and housing markets since 
the “Roaring Twenties” and the Great Depression.  Scholars have 
studied the events that led to the recent financial crisis and have 
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compared those events to the causes of the Great Depression.1  
Analysts also have analyzed whether “universal banks”—financial 
conglomerates that control deposit-taking banks as well as securities 
underwriters and dealers—played pivotal roles in both crises.2 
 John Reed, a former cochairman of Citigroup, recently argued 
that the United States Congress made a serious mistake when it 
enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act3 (GLBA) in 1999.  GLBA 
repealed the Banking Act of 19334 (Glass-Steagall) and authorized the 
creation of universal banks that resembled the bank-centered 
“financial department stores” of the 1920s.5  In Reed’s view, “the 
universal banking model is inherently unstable and unworkable” and 
cannot be made safe by any amount of regulatory reform.6  Proposals 
                                                 
 1. See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS:  THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE 
GREAT RECESSION, AND THE USES—AND MISUSES—OF HISTORY (2015); ERIK F. GERDING, 
LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 84-92, 293-98, 427-69 (2014); ROBERT Z. 
ALIBER & CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES:  A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL CRISES 26-116, 273-301 (7th ed. 2015); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of 
Universal Banking:  Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial 
Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 966-69, 980-94, 997-1024 (2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Matthew Richardson, Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Large Banks and 
the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL STREET:  THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW 
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 181 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011); Peter J. 
Wallison, Did the “Repeal” of Glass-Steagall Have Any Role in the Financial Crisis?  Not 
Guilty.  Not Even Close, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION:  LEGISLATION AND 
IMPLICATIONS 19 (John A. Tatom ed., 2011); Douglas M. Branson, A Return to Old-Time 
Religion?  The Glass-Steagall Act, the Volcker Rule, Limits on Proprietary Trading, and 
Sustainability, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 359 (2014); Philip A. Wallach, Moving Beyond Calls 
for a “New Glass-Steagall,” ISSUES GOVERNANCE STUD. (Brookings Inst., Washington D.C.), 
Sept. 2012, at 1, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/9/13-glass-
steagal-wallach/13-glass-steagall-wallach.pdf; Carolyn Sissoko, The Plight of Modern 
Markets:  How Universal Banking Undermines Capital Markets (Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. 
of Law Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci. Research Papers Series, Paper No. CLASS14-33, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2480068. 
 3. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 4. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338. 
 5. John Reed, We Were Wrong About Universal Banking, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 
2015, 3:52 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/255fafee-8872-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896. 
html; see also Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 972-75 (discussing the enactment of GLBA and the 
demise of Glass-Steagall); infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text (discussing the creation 
of bank-centered financial department stores during the 1910s and 1920s). 
 6. Reed, supra note 5.  Reed also argued that the “high-risk, high-cost” culture of 
“investment banking and trading” is “incompatible” with the “risk averse” culture of 
“traditional banking.”  Id.  Reed previously apologized in 2009 for his role in arranging the 
1998 merger between Travelers Company and Citicorp, which created Citigroup and placed 
great pressure on Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall.  In contrast, Sandy Weill, the other 
cofounder of Citigroup, at first defended his role in creating Citigroup and in persuading 
Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup:  A Case Study in 
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to reinstate Glass-Steagall’s wall of separation between commercial 
banks7 and securities firms became major topics of debate among 
presidential candidates during the early stages of the nomination 
battles for the 2016 election.8 
 It therefore seems appropriate to revisit the question of whether 
Congress had good reasons in 1933 to separate commercial banks 
from securities firms.  This Article is part of a larger project in which I 
plan to examine the rise and fall of financial department stores in the 
1920s and 1930s and to compare their experience with the central role 
that second-generation universal banks played during the booms and 
crashes of the 1990s and 2000s. 
 As I will describe in Part II of this Article, large universal banks 
became leading underwriters and distributors of securities in the 
United States during the 1920s.  The preeminent universal banks of the 
1920s were also the two largest U.S. commercial banks:  National City 
Bank of New York (National City), the predecessor of today’s 
Citigroup, and Chase National Bank (Chase), one of the predecessors 
of today’s JPMorgan Chase & Co.  National City and Chase 
established securities affiliates to evade legal restrictions on the 
securities activities that were permissible for national banks.  Both 
banks and their affiliates created far-flung networks of offices to 
                                                                                                             
Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 134-35 (2014); see also Wilmarth, 
supra note 1, at 972-73 (discussing the impact of the Travelers-Citicorp merger in pressuring 
Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall).  However, in 2012, Weill changed his mind.  He called for 
universal banks to “be broken up so that the taxpayer will never be at risk, the depositors 
won’t be at risk, the leverage of the [commercial] banks will be something reasonable,” and 
independent securities firms could “make some mistakes” without causing a systemic 
financial crisis.  Kevin Wack, Weill Puts Glass-Steagall Back on Washington’s Agenda, AM. 
BANKER (July 25, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_143/sandy-weill-puts-
glass-steagall-back-on-washingtons-agenda-1051271-1.html (quoting Weill). 
 7. As used in this Article, the term “bank” refers to a commercial bank unless 
otherwise indicated.  The term “securities firm” will generally be used to refer to an 
investment banking firm. 
 8. See Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator for Mass., Senators Warren, 
McCain, Cantwell and King Introduce 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=872  (describing a newly introduced bill 
to adopt “a modern version” of Glass-Steagall in order to “separate traditional banks . . . from 
riskier financial institutions that offer services such as investment banking, insurance, swaps 
dealing, and hedge fund and private equity activities”); Gabriel Debenedetti, Sanders Thrusts 
Wall Street Reform to Center of Clinton Showdown, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/ 
story/2016/01/bernie-sanders-break-big-banks-217356 (last updated Jan. 5, 2016, 3:03 PM) 
(reporting that Democratic presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders 
“locked horns . . . when it c[ame] to reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act,” because Clinton 
opposed the idea, while Sanders “renewed his call for a ‘21st Century Glass-Steagall Act’”); 
Peter Schroeder, Glass-Steagall Takes Center Stage in 2016, HILL (Nov. 12, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/259881-glass-steagall-takes-center-stage-in-2016. 
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facilitate their underwriting and sales of securities in the United States 
and foreign countries. 
 National City and Chase earned huge profits from their securities 
operations during the economic boom of the 1920s, but they suffered 
massive losses during the Great Depression.  Both banks announced in 
March 1933 that they would shut down their securities affiliates.  Both 
banks also received bailouts from the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) in December 1933. 
 As I will discuss in Part III.A, the Great Crash of 1929 and the 
waves of bank failures between 1930 and 1933 prompted Congress to 
hold a series of investigative hearings.  Those hearings revealed that 
universal banks used unsound and deceptive practices to sell large 
volumes of high-risk securities during the 1920s.  Universal banks also 
made ill-advised loans to investors and issuers to promote their 
underwriting and trading of securities.  The sale of speculative 
securities by universal banks inflicted enormous losses on investors 
during the Great Depression.  Congress responded in June 1933 by 
passing Glass-Steagall, which mandated a strict separation between the 
banking industry and the securities markets.9 
 Part III.B provides illustrative examples of the abusive securities 
practices and conflicts of interest that occurred at National City, Chase, 
and their securities affiliates during the 1920s and early 1930s.  
National City and Chase used misleading prospectuses and high-
pressure sales techniques to promote the sale of hazardous foreign 
bonds and other high-risk securities to retail investors (including their 
depositors) and smaller financial institutions.  Both banks made 
unsound loans to investors and issuers of securities to support the 
activities of their securities affiliates.  Both banks organized trading 
pools to pump up the prices of their own stocks, as well as the stocks 
                                                 
 9. See VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA:  A HISTORY 240-
381 (1970); MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET:  HOW FERDINAND PECORA’S 
INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE (2010); JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:  A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 1-38 (rev. ed. 1995); W. Nelson 
Peach, The Security Affiliates of National Banks, in 58 THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 
STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 439 (1940); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did 
Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S. Economy’s Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 
1921-33?  A Preliminary Assessment, in 4 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND 
FINANCIAL LAW 559, 564-68, 607-11 (Int’l Monetary Fund comp., 2005), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=838267; Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking:  A 
History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 490-524 (1971).  For the most prominent scholarly challenge 
to the merits of Glass-Steagall, see GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL 
AND INVESTMENT BANKING:  THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED 
(1990). 
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of favored clients.  Insiders at both banks took advantage of their 
securities operations to reap extraordinary financial gains.  Revelations 
of securities abuses and insider self-dealing at National City and Chase 
triggered widespread public outrage and helped to build public support 
for enactment of Glass-Steagall as well as the Securities Act of 193310 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 
 The abuses and conflicts of interest that occurred at National City 
and Chase illustrate the potential dangers of allowing commercial 
banks to affiliate with securities underwriters and dealers.  The “Pecora 
hearings” revealed pervasive conflicts of interest that existed across the 
deposit-taking, lending, underwriting, and trading activities of 
National City and Chase.  The disastrous experiences of National City 
and Chase during the early 1930s demonstrated the dangers of 
allowing banks to use their deposits and lending facilities to promote 
speculative underwriting and trading operations.  The near collapse 
and bailouts of both banks also highlighted the systemic risks that are 
likely to occur when major banks and the securities markets become 
tightly linked.  Finally, it does not appear to be a coincidence that the 
emergence of universal banks in the 1920s was associated with an 
enormous boom in the issuance of unsound and high-risk securities to 
the public.  The misconduct that took place at National City and Chase 
demonstrated the need for strong laws to protect unsophisticated 
investors and other consumers against exploitation by powerful 
financial institutions. 
II. NATIONAL CITY AND CHASE BECAME LEADING PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS DURING THE 1920S 
 During the decade leading up to the stock market crash of 1929, 
banks greatly expanded their presence in the securities business.  As I 
have described in previous work, both bank loans on securities and 
bank investments in securities grew rapidly between the end of World 
War I and 1930.12  This Part focuses on the dramatic expansion of 
securities-underwriting and -distribution activities that occurred at 
                                                 
 10. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 
2A (2012)). 
 11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. ch. 2B). 
 12. See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 569-70 (stating that bank loans on securities rose 
from $5.2 billion to $13 billion between 1919 and 1930, while bank investments in securities 
grew from $8.4 billion to $13.7 billion between 1921 and 1930). 
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universal banks in general, and at National City and Chase in 
particular, during the Roaring Twenties. 
 The large-scale entry of banks into the securities-underwriting 
business in the 1920s marked the final stage in the emergence of 
universal banks (frequently called “financial department stores”) in the 
United States.  As described below, national banks organized securities 
affiliates in the early 1900s to circumvent legal restrictions on their 
authorized securities activities.  Banks played a major role during 
World War I in selling war bonds issued by the Allies and the United 
States.  The great success of the war bond sales and favorable 
economic conditions during the 1920s encouraged universal banks to 
expand their securities operations aggressively after the war ended.  
National City and Chase led that movement. 
A. National City, Chase, and Other Large Banks Organized 
Securities Affiliates To Evade Legal Restrictions on Their 
Securities Activities 
 The National Bank Act of 186413 authorized national banks to 
buy and sell federal government bonds, but it did not specifically 
authorize other types of securities activities.14  During the late 
nineteenth century, the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller), the 
regulator for national banks, permitted national banks to establish bond 
departments.  With the Comptroller’s acquiescence, national banks 
used their bond departments to compete with state-chartered banks 
and trust companies in buying and selling bonds issued by state and 
local governments and corporations.15 
 Several court decisions and a 1902 opinion by the Comptroller 
determined that the National Bank Act of 1864 did not allow national 
banks to invest in equity stocks or to underwrite distributions of debt 
                                                 
 13. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. ch. 2). 
 14. FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING 389 (Johnson Reprint 
Corp. 1968) (1947); Peach, supra note 9, at 481, 489. 
 15. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 97-100, 273; REDLICH, supra note 14, at 389-92; H. 
PARKER WILLIS & JOHN M. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION:  AMERICAN POST-WAR 
PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENTS 188-93, 536-37 (1934); Peach, supra note 9, at 456-57, 476-
83, 488-89; Perkins, supra note 9, at 486-90, 493-95.  For a description of the activities of 
National City’s bond department during the 1890s and early 1900s, see HAROLD VAN B. 
CLEVELAND & THOMAS F. HUERTAS WITH RACHEL STRAUBER ET AL., CITIBANK:  1812-1970, at 
37, 40-41, 44-47, 56-58 (1985).  The McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927), ratified 
the authority of bond departments of national banks to buy and sell marketable debt 
securities. Peach, supra note 9, at 477-80. 
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or equity securities.16  To evade those rulings, large national banks 
established state-chartered securities affiliates.17  Bank executives used 
various types of control arrangements (including voting trusts and 
combined or linked stock certificates) to connect each bank with its 
sponsored securities affiliate.  Those arrangements ensured that 
(1) shares of the bank’s stock would be purchased, sold, or transferred 
together with shares of its affiliate’s stock and (2)  the bank’s senior 
management would maintain control over both the bank and its 
affiliate.18 
 In 1911, National City established National City Co. (NCC) as its 
securities affiliate.  Attorney General Charles Wickersham challenged 
the legality of NCC and obtained a supporting legal opinion from 
Solicitor General Frederick Lehmann.19  Lehmann’s opinion 
determined that National City’s affiliation with NCC would violate the 
National Bank Act of 1864 by involving National City “in business 
and ventures beyond its corporate powers.”20  Lehmann focused in 
particular on the complete control that National City’s officers and 
directors would possess over NCC, as well as the large stock positions 
that NCC owned in sixteen other banks.  Lehmann concluded that 
NCC’s ownership of bank stocks contravened an 1899 United States 
Supreme Court decision, which declared that a national bank could not 
own the stock of any other bank.21 
 Lehmann expressed further concerns about the broader 
implications of National City’s affiliation with NCC.  Lehmann 
warned that NCC’s securities activities would encourage the 
                                                 
 16. REDLICH, supra note 14, at 393; Peach, supra note 9, at 483-85, 488-89, 498-99. 
 17. Beginning in 1903, national banks organized state banks or trust companies to 
serve as securities affiliates.  In 1908, the First National Bank of New York organized the first 
nonbank securities affiliate.  REDLICH, supra note 14, at 393; Peach, supra note 9, at 491-94, 
499-501. 
 18. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 97-98, 271-72; REDLICH, supra note 14, at 393-94; 
Peach, supra note 9, at 489-91, 499-506. 
 19. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 66; PERINO, 
supra note 9, at 203-05; Peach, supra note 9, at 581-83. 
 20. Stock Exchange Practices:  Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 239 Before a 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 72d Cong. 2040 (1933) [hereinafter 
Senate National City Hearings] (opinion of Frederick W. Lehmann, Solicitor General of the 
United States); accord id. at 2030-42; see also Peach, supra note 9, at 581-83 (discussing 
Lehmann’s opinion). 
 21. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2034-35 (opinion of Frederick 
W. Lehmann) (discussing Concord First Nat’l Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U.S. 364 (1899)); id. at 
2037-41 (analyzing the joint control that National City’s officers and directors would exercise 
over National City and NCC, as well as NCC’s ownership of stock in sixteen banks); see also 
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 64 tbl.4.1 (listing NCC’s 
ownership of stock in fifteen U.S. banks and one foreign bank). 
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“speculative use” of National City’s funds to support NCC’s clients, 
with resulting “peril” to National City.  Additionally, he argued, the 
precedent established by NCC’s affiliation with National City would 
allow “many enterprises and many banks [to be] brought and bound 
together,” with the consequence that “the failure of one may involve all 
in a common disaster.”22  Lehman’s warnings were prescient; they 
anticipated the debacle that occurred at National City and NCC during 
the Great Depression. 
 Secretary of the Treasury Franklin MacVeagh and Secretary of 
State Philander Knox opposed the views of Wickersham and Lehmann 
and supported NCC’s validity.23  MacVeagh asserted that National 
City’s establishment of NCC as a separate affiliate “complied with the 
letter of the law.”24  MacVeagh also endorsed the creation of securities 
affiliates because they enabled national banks to compete for securities 
business “with state banks and trust companies,” which possessed 
broader security powers.25  MacVeagh wanted to keep “a large part of 
the banking system within [the United States Department of the 
Treasury’s] jurisdiction” by establishing a more level playing field 
between national and state banks.26 
 After considering the conflicting opinions expressed by the 
United States Departments of Justice, the Treasury, and State, 
President William Howard Taft decided not to pursue any legal 
challenge against NCC.  To encourage that outcome, NCC voluntarily 
sold its portfolio of domestic bank stocks.  NCC thereafter focused its 
business on underwriting and trading in securities issued by 
governments and nonbank corporations.27 
 In 1916, NCC acquired N.W. Halsey & Co. (Halsey), a prominent 
securities firm with retail brokerage offices in major cities across the 
nation.  At the same time, NCC took over the activities of National 
City’s bond department.28  In a public advertisement, NCC proclaimed 
that its acquisition of Halsey’s operations and National City’s bond 
department would enable NCC to provide “a superior investment 
                                                 
 22. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2042 (opinion of Frederick W. 
Lehmann). 
 23. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 62-63, 66; 
PERINO, supra note 9, at 205-06. 
 24. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 66. 
 25. PERINO, supra note 9, at 206. 
 26. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 62-63. 
 27. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 98, 274; CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET 
AL., supra note 15, at 66-67; Peach, supra note 9, at 584-86. 
 28. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 274; CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 66-67. 
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service” by virtue of its “[a]mple resources” and “[e]xperienced 
management,” as well as its “intimate knowledge of the condition of 
business enterprise and the requirements of investors throughout the 
country.”29 
 Chase followed National City’s example in 1917, when Chase 
organized its own securities affiliate, Chase Securities Corporation 
(CSC).30  In 1930, CSC greatly expanded the scope of its operations by 
acquiring the domestic and international securities operations of 
Harris, Forbes & Co. (Harris Forbes).31  Other large national and state 
banks pursued similar strategies.  By 1929, more than 130 banks 
controlled securities affiliates, while more than 350 other banks 
conducted securities activities through bond departments.32 
B. National City, Chase, and Other Universal Banks Expanded Their 
Securities Activities During and After World War I 
1. The Sale of War Bonds Provided a Training Ground for Universal 
Banks 
 Between 1914 and 1917, U.S. securities firms and commercial 
banks formed nationwide syndicates to sell $2.5 billion worth of bonds 
issued by the Allied powers (primarily Great Britain and France).  The 
campaigns to sell Allied war bonds represented a “sea change in the 
scale of U.S. investment banking” and encouraged securities firms and 
banks to increase their capacity to market and sell securities to the 
general public.33  National City’s success in selling Allied war bonds 
persuaded the bank’s senior management that NCC must expand its 
“placing power” because “broader distribution held the key to [NCC’s] 
continued success as an underwriter.”34 
 After the United States entered World War I in 1917, U.S. banks 
and securities firms quickly shifted from selling Allied bonds to 
supporting the federal government’s efforts to finance the war.35  The 
Treasury Department launched massive campaigns to sell four issues 
of “Liberty Loans” in 1917 and 1918, followed by a “Victory Loan” in 
                                                 
 29. Peach, supra note 9, at 525-26 (quoting NCC’s advertisement in the Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle on October 14, 1916). 
 30. Id. at 501-02. 
 31. Id. at 505-06, 535. 
 32. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 274-79; Peach, supra note 9, at 499-507, 520-21, 521 
tbl.I. 
 33. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 86. 
 34. Id.; see also CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 204-09, 211-12, 216-17, 221 (describing 
sales of Allied bonds by U.S. securities firms and banks between 1914 and 1917). 
 35. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 224-27. 
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1919 that was designed to “finish the job” and “bring the boys 
home.”36  The “Liberty Bond” drives represented an “unprecedented” 
call on the savings of ordinary citizens.37  To promote the sale of 
Liberty Bonds, the Treasury Department organized an elaborate 
“propaganda campaign,”38 which “perfected all of the techniques now 
associated with modern advertising” and featured patriotic rallies, 
parades, and speeches by prominent celebrities and business leaders.39 
 The government encouraged ordinary citizens to buy Liberty 
Bonds on installment plans or to buy “war savings stamps” that could 
be bundled together and converted into bonds.40  More than twenty 
million Americans purchased Liberty Bonds and war savings stamps.41  
The experience of owning Liberty Bonds persuaded many Americans 
that “money could be made by the simple process of holding paper 
securities until they went up in value.”42 
 Commercial banks eagerly participated in the Liberty Bond 
drives and sold more than half of the $21.5 billion of Liberty Bonds 
that were issued between 1917 and 1919.43  Banks received no 
commissions or other payments, but they gained many practical 
benefits from their work on the Liberty Bond campaigns.  Banks 
became familiar “not only with the use of high-pressure selling 
techniques but also with a tremendous number of new potential buyers 
of securities.”44  Most importantly, banks “won [the] confidence” of 
                                                 
 36. Id. at 224; Peach, supra note 9, at 470; Richard Sutch, Financing the Great War:  
A Class Tax for the Wealthy, Liberty Bonds for All 15-16, 25 (Berkeley Econ. History Lab. 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. WP2015-09, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665730. 
 37. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 224. 
 38. Sutch, supra note 36, at 16. 
 39. Id. at 16-21 (explaining that the Treasury Department recruited actors Charlie 
Chaplin, Douglas Fairbanks, and Mary Pickford; aviatrix Ruth Law; and 75,000 volunteer 
speakers to advocate the purchase of Liberty Bonds at patriotic rallies, parades, and other 
events); see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY:  HOW FINANCE 
TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 251-54 (2007) (describing the Liberty Bond campaigns). 
 40. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 225; see also Sutch, supra note 36, at 13-15 (describing 
“War Thrift Stamps,” which could be bought for twenty-five cents and bundled together to 
purchase $50 Liberty Bonds, and noting that small investors who purchased and bundled 
stamps accounted for half of all Liberty Bond sales). 
 41. Julia Cathleen Ott, When Wall Street Met Main Street:  The Quest for an 
Investors’ Democracy and the Emergence of the Retail Investor in the United States, 1890-
1930, 9 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 619, 619-20, 622 (2008). 
 42. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 226 (quoting Benjamin Ginzburg, Wall Street Under 
the New Deal, 245 N. AM. REV. 58, 70 (1938)). 
 43. Peach, supra note 9, at 469-70. 
 44. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 226; see also CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER 
ET AL., supra note 15, at 384 n.4 (“What [NCC] learned from the Liberty bond campaigns 
was the technique of mass marketing.”); MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 255 (“The Liberty loan 
drives provided a graduate education for bankers and securities salesmen.”). 
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ordinary investors because “they offered bonds of unquestioned 
soundness.”45 
 Charles E. Mitchell was the “aggressive” leader of NCC during 
World War I, and he became the president of National City in 1921.46  
Mitchell quickly recognized that NCC’s sales of Liberty Bonds would 
encourage millions of households to consider buying other types of 
bonds from NCC after the war ended.  In June 1917, Mitchell declared 
that the Liberty Bond drives were enlisting “a large, new army of 
investors in this country who have never heretofore known what it 
means to own a coupon bond and who may in the future be developed 
into savers and bond buyers.”47 
 In March 1919, Mitchell told a class of National City and NCC 
trainees that “if we could bring the investment banking house to the 
people in such a way that they would look upon it as a part and parcel 
of their everyday life; if, by advertising, we could spread the gospel of 
thrift and saving and investment; . . . we could then . . . lift this 
investment banking business to a level it had never reached before.”48  
By 1919, NCC had already established branch offices in more than 
fifty U.S. cities.  Mitchell told his recruits that NCC’s branches “are 
already working to make connections with the great new bond-buying 
public . . . and are preparing to serve the public on a straightforward 
basis, just as it is served by the United Cigar Stores or Child’s 
Restaurants.”49 
                                                 
 45. Peach, supra note 9, at 471. 
 46. Id. at 457-58, 525.  In 1927, a New York journalist described Mitchell as “a 
human power plant” and “a tireless worker.”  Charles McD. Puckette, Wall Street Harkens to 
C.E. Mitchell, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1927, at 12; see also CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH 
STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 87 (quoting former National City president Frank 
Vanderlip’s observation that Mitchell had “an astonishing capacity to create energy”); 
MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 245 (stating that Mitchell was “known as the greatest bond 
salesman of all time”). 
 47. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 228 (quoting Charles E. Mitchell, “Sound Inflation,” 
20 MAG. WALL STREET 295, 295 (1917)). 
 48. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 136 (quoting 
C.E. Mitchell, Vice President, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., Lecture to Banking III Class, Training 
Lecture at National City Bank (Mar. 18, 1919)); see also SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 24 
(explaining that Mitchell “took young men and women, gave them a course of training on the 
sale of securities, and sent them out to find the investors”). 
 49. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 136 (quoting 
Mitchell, supra note 48); see also MITCHELL, supra note 39, at 245 (commenting on 
Mitchell’s lecture). 
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2. National City and Chase Became the Leading U.S. Universal 
Banks During the 1920s 
 During the great economic boom of the 1920s, commercial banks 
and their securities affiliates vastly expanded their involvement in 
originating and distributing public issues of bonds and stocks.  By the 
end of the Roaring Twenties, universal banks had become “the 
dominant force” and “by far the most important element in the 
investment banking business” in the United States.50  In 1927, banks 
and their affiliates or bond departments accounted for 22% of 
originations and almost 37% of participations in all new bond issues in 
the United States.51  In 1929 and 1930, banks and their affiliates or 
bond departments conducted 45% of originations and more than half 
of participations in all new bond issues.52 
 National City, Chase, and their securities affiliates were the 
unquestioned leaders among universal banks.  Both banks built 
extensive networks of offices for selling securities in the United States 
and abroad.  By the late 1920s, NCC maintained offices in more than 
fifty U.S. cities and several foreign cities.53  NCC also posted sales 
representatives at thirty-seven of National City’s domestic branches 
and many of National City’s ninety-eight international branches, which 
were spread across twenty-three countries.54  NCC linked its office 
network with more than 11,000 miles of private telegraph wire.55 
 NCC sold about $20 billion of bonds and stocks to the public 
prior to 1933, and by 1927, it was “the largest agency in the world for 
the distribution of investment securities.”56  From 1921 to 1929, NCC 
originated or participated in the distribution of $10.73 billion of bonds, 
representing more than a fifth of all domestic and foreign bonds sold 
in the United States during that period.57  NCC was particularly active 
                                                 
 50. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 279; accord Perkins, supra note 9, at 495. 
 51. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 279. 
 52. Id.; Peach, supra note 9, at 546-49. 
 53. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 152-53; Peach, 
supra note 9, at 527. 
 54. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 116, 123, 152-
53; Peach, supra note 9, at 527. 
 55. Peach, supra note 9, at 527. 
 56. Id. at 458, 527; accord Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1887-88 
(statement of Charles E. Mitchell, Chairman, National City Bank of New York and National 
City Co.) (estimating that NCC sold $20 billion of bonds and stocks prior to 1933); id. at 
1926-27 (statement of Hugh B. Baker, President, National City Co.) (same). 
 57. See CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 139, 140 
tbl.8.1 (showing that $50.27 billion of domestic and foreign bonds were issued in the United 
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in the field of foreign bonds. It originated or participated in the 
distribution of more than a third of all foreign bonds sold in the United 
States between 1921 and 1929.58 
 Chase’s securities affiliate, CSC, also established a far-flung 
network of sales offices.  In 1927, CSC began to make retail sales of 
securities to small investors, thereby expanding its operations beyond 
wholesale distributions of securities to institutional investors.  After 
acquiring the Harris Forbes securities firm in 1930, CSC operated 
more than fifty sales offices in the United States as well as several 
foreign offices.59  CSC sold $6.16 billion worth of domestic and 
foreign securities to investors between its founding in 1917 and its 
dissolution in 1933, and most of those securities were sold between 
1927 and 1930.60 
 National City and Chase were the largest banks in the United 
States in 1929 and 1930, respectively.61  As described below, National 
City and Chase provided large amounts of loans, investments, and 
other support for the securities activities of NCC and CSC.62  The 
managements of both organizations closely coordinated the operations 
of their banks and securities affiliates.63  Under Mitchell’s leadership, 
National City and NCC worked together to create “a global, all-
purpose financial intermediary” that functioned as a financial 
department store.64  As Mitchell explained during a congressional 
hearing, National City offered “a complete banking and investment 
                                                                                                             
States from 1921-1929 and that NCC originated $3.22 billion and participated in $7.51 
billion of those bond issues). 
 58. See id. at 140 tbl.8.1, 145-46, 146 tbl.8.4 (showing that $10.27 billion of foreign 
bonds were issued in the United States from 1921-1929 and that NCC originated or 
participated in $3.78 billion of those bond issues). 
 59. Peach, supra note 9, at 533-35. 
 60. Id. at 535 n.65, 593-96; Stock Exchange Practices:  Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. 
Res. 56 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong. 2281-82 (1933) 
[hereinafter Senate Chase Hearings] (statement of Albert H. Wiggin). 
 61. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 157 (stating that 
National City was the largest U.S. bank in June 1929); Peach, supra note 9, at 455 n.4 (stating 
that Chase surpassed National City to become the largest U.S. bank when Chase acquired the 
Equitable Trust Co. in 1930). 
 62. See infra Part III.B. 
 63. See CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 127-30, 
139-43; Peach, supra note 9, at 525-29, 532-35. 
 64. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 156; see also 
CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET:  A HISTORY 153, 170 (updated ed. 2012) (discussing the 
strategy of National City and other large U.S. banks to create “financial department stores”); 
Peach, supra note 9, at 451, 510 (describing the desire of universal banks to offer “department 
store banking” that included commercial and investment banking services). 
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and trust service” to its clients so that they could obtain all of their 
financial services “under one roof.”65 
 National City, Chase, and other universal banks played key roles 
in promoting the sale of tremendous volumes of debt and equity 
securities during the 1920s.66  Contemporary observers concluded, and 
modern scholars agree, that the securities boom of the 1920s could not 
have reached the same magnitude without the involvement of large 
universal banks.67  Universal banks used their deposits to provide 
funding for margin loans that enabled investors to buy securities, as 
well as business loans that cemented their relationships with corporate 
issuers.68  Universal banks also used their branches and affiliate offices 
to market securities to large customer bases, which included 
depositors, trust customers, middle-class professionals, and small 
correspondent banks.69  In addition, universal banks gained the trust of 
                                                 
 65. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 158 (quoting 
Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems:  Hearings on S. Res. 71 
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 71st Cong. 317 (1931) 
(statement of Charles E. Mitchell, Chairman, National City Bank of New York)). 
 66. See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 577 (explaining that, from 1919 to 1929, $49 
billion of securities were issued by U.S. corporations, $14 billion of debt securities were 
issued by state and local governments, and $11 billion of securities were issued in the United 
States by foreign governments and corporations). 
 67. Senator Frederick Walcott declared in 1932 that the “flood tide of speculation” 
during the 1920s would never have occurred without the credit and distribution facilities 
provided by universal banks.  Traditional investment banking firms like J.P. Morgan & Co. 
and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. did not possess the financial resources or infrastructure needed to 
accomplish the massive public offerings of domestic and foreign securities that occurred 
during the 1920s.  Those offerings required nationwide distribution networks and “very 
expansive credit, which, of course, brought in the banks.”  75 CONG. REC. 9904 (1932) 
(statement of Sen. Walcott).  With regard to bank securities affiliates, Walcott observed, 
“[T]heir growth has been phenomenal, coincident with the growth of the security business 
. . . .”  Id. at 9904-05; see also id. at 9888 (statement of Sen. Glass) (contending that securities 
affiliates of banks “were perhaps the greatest contributors to the riot of credit and inflation in 
1928-29, with the result that the country is now almost in an irreparable condition”); 
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 139-47 (explaining that 
National City’s credit resources and distribution facilities provided “placing power” that 
established NCC’s status as a top underwriter of securities and also noting that J.P. Morgan & 
Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. had “no retail distribution of their own, while National City had 
the country’s best”); GEISST, supra note 64, at 159-62, 172 (discussing the important role 
played by universal banks in promoting public offerings of securities during the 1920s); 
Peach, supra note 9, at 512-13, 541-50 (describing the growth of bank securities operations 
during the 1920s and the competitive advantages enjoyed by universal banks in underwriting 
and distributing securities). 
 68. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 273-77; CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET 
AL., supra note 15, at 127-31, 139-43, 156-58; Peach, supra note 9, at 451-52, 466-69, 549-
50. 
 69. See CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 275-76; CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER 
ET AL., supra note 15, at 135-43, 152-53; Peach, supra note 9, at 466-69. 
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unsophisticated investors based on the banks’ public reputations for 
soundness, stability, and investment expertise.70 
3. After Producing Significant Profits During the 1920s, the 
Securities Activities of National City and Chase Inflicted Huge 
Losses on Both Banks During the Early 1930s 
 National City and Chase reaped large profits from their securities 
activities during the 1920s, but they suffered crippling losses after the 
stock market crashed in October 1929.  NCC generated total profits of 
$25 million during the boom years from 1925 to 1929.71  In contrast, 
NCC suffered more than $100 million of losses from the end of 1929 
through the end of 1932, and those losses erased more than 80% of 
NCC’s capital.72  After earning total profits of more than $85 million 
between 1925 and 1929, National City’s banking operations recorded 
almost $170 million of losses from January 1930 through January 
1934, which wiped out two-thirds of National City’s shareholders’ 
equity.73  Many of National City’s losses resulted from bad loans that 
the bank made to support NCC’s securities activities.74 
 Chase’s record was almost as bad as National City’s.  After 
reporting profits of about $20 million between 1925 and 1929, CSC 
wrote down its capital account by $55 million between 1930 and 
1933.75  Chase reported total losses of $130 million from its banking 
operations between 1930 and 1934, cutting its net worth by more than 
half.76  Many of those losses were caused by bad loans that Chase 
made to prop up CSC’s securities deals.77 
                                                 
 70. See CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 135-39; 
PERINO, supra note 9, at 132-36, 254-56; Peach, supra note 9, at 475, 490, 580. 
 71. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 390 n.44. 
 72. See id. at 160, 161 tbl.9.2 (showing that NCC’s capital declined from $129 
million to $21 million between the end of 1929 and the end of 1932). 
 73. See id. at 191; see also id. at 134 tbl.7.8 (showing that National City earned total 
profits of $86.5 million between 1925 and 1929). 
 74. Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 602; see also infra notes 202-204 and accompanying 
text (discussing NCC’s borrowing from National City to facilitate NCC’s stock purchases). 
 75. See Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2388-89 committee exhibit 8 
(showing CSC’s profits from 1925 to 1929 and documenting that CSC created $119 million 
of reserves against losses between 1929 and 1933); Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 602. 
 76. Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 602; see also Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 
2355 committee exhibit 6 (showing that Chase created $212 million of reserves against losses 
between 1929 and 1933). 
 77. Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 602-03; see also infra notes 205-207 and 
accompanying text (discussing loans Chase made to support CSC’s sale of Cuban bonds and 
to restructure and refinance General Theatres Equipment, Inc., and Fox Film Corporation). 
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 National City and Chase announced plans to shut down their 
securities affiliates in March 1933, even before Congress passed 
Glass-Steagall.  In December 1933, National City and Chase each sold 
$50 million of preferred stock to the RFC, which Congress established 
for the purposes of providing assistance to troubled banks and other 
struggling enterprises.  The RFC’s capital stock infusions helped 
National City, Chase, and their affiliates absorb losses from 
depreciated investments and nonperforming loans.78  National City and 
Chase followed highly conservative business policies to recover from 
their devastating losses during the Great Depression.  Like many other 
banks, National City and Chase cut their dividends, reduced their loan 
portfolios, increased their cash reserves, and shifted their assets to 
safer, highly liquid investments such as government securities.79 
III. THE PECORA HEARINGS REVEALED WIDESPREAD ABUSES AND 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF 
NATIONAL CITY AND CHASE 
A. The Collapse of the Securities Markets During the Great 
Depression and Revelations of Securities Abuses During the 
Pecora Hearings Destroyed the Public’s Faith in Wall Street 
 The collapse of securities values during the Great Depression 
inflicted devastating losses on investors.  Stocks listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) declined in value by more than 80% between 
September 1929 and July 1932, wiping out over $74 billion of 
shareholder investments.80  Domestic and foreign bonds listed on the 
NYSE declined in value by more than 35% between September 1930 
and April 1933, destroying almost $19 billion of bondholder 
                                                 
 78. JESSE H. JONES WITH EDWARD ANGLY, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS:  MY THIRTEEN 
YEARS WITH THE RFC (1932-1945), at 35-36 (1951); Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 603; see also 
infra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions by National City and Chase 
to close their securities affiliates in March 1933). 
 79. Charles W. Calomiris & Berry Wilson, Bank Capital and Portfolio Management:  
The 1930s “Capital Crunch” and the Scramble To Shed Risk, 77 J. BUS. 421, 422, 436-38, 
450 tbl.9, 450-452 (2004); see also CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra 
note 15, at 199-204 (describing National City’s reduction in lending and its large increase in 
cash reserves and Treasury securities); JAMES S. OLSON, SAVING CAPITALISM:  THE 
RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION AND THE NEW DEAL, 1933-1940, at 82 (1988) 
(stating that U.S. bank loans fell from $38.1 billion to $20.3 billion between 1931 and 1935, 
while the share of bank funds invested in government securities rose from 21% to 58% 
between 1929 and 1934). 
 80. See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 7 (1934) (stating that the value of all listed stocks fell 
from $89.7 billion to $15.6 billion during that period). 
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investments.81  As a United States Senate committee report observed in 
1934, “The annals of finance present no counterpart to this enormous 
decline in security prices.”82  In the committee’s view, this implosion of 
securities values contributed significantly to 
[t]he wholesale closing of banks and other financial institutions; the 
loss of deposits and savings; the drastic curtailment of credit; the 
inability of debtors to meet their obligations; . . . the diminution of the 
purchasing power of the people to the point where industry and 
commerce were prostrated; and the increase in bankruptcy, poverty, and 
distress . . . .83 
 Plummeting securities values and the accompanying Great 
Depression destroyed the public’s faith in Wall Street.  As Vincent 
Carosso observed, “Rarely had a group lost so much status and respect 
so rapidly as had investment bankers in the three years following the 
great stock market crash.”84  In 1932 and 1933, the “tarnished public 
image” of investment bankers “deteriorate[d] still further” as 
congressional investigators produced evidence of a wide range of 
securities abuses and conflicts of interest.85 
 As the lead investigator and chief counsel for a series of Senate 
committee hearings, Ferdinand Pecora uncovered serious misconduct 
by both independent securities firms and securities affiliates of 
commercial banks.  Pecora’s role was so pivotal that the Senate 
hearings became known as the “Pecora hearings.”86  Prior to Pecora’s 
appointment as chief counsel in early 1933, the “public’s simmering 
and unfocused anger at Wall Street” had not yet produced strong 
momentum for comprehensive financial reform.87  The shocking 
                                                 
 81. See id. (reporting that the value of all listed bonds fell from $49.29 billion to 
$30.6 billion during that period). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 320; see also id. at 305 (“The events of the crash made 
a mockery of the investment bankers’ much touted expertise and overoptimistic forecasts.”).  
As Bernard Baruch similarly explained, “The stereotype of bankers as conservative, careful, 
prudent individuals was shattered in 1929.”  RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN:  AN 
AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 320 (1990) (quoting 
Baruch). 
 85. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 320-21. 
 86. PERINO, supra note 9, at 5 (“Pecora’s stellar performance was so dominating, his 
questioning so riveting, and his investigations so thorough that the [Senate] Banking and 
Currency [Committee] hearings eventually became known simply as the Pecora hearings.”); 
see also CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 352-53 (referring to the “Pecora investigation” and the 
“Pecora hearings”).  For Pecora’s account of the investigation he led, see FERDINAND PECORA, 
WALL STREET UNDER OATH:  THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY CHANGERS (1939). 
 87. PERINO, supra note 9, at 88. 
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revelations of Pecora’s investigations proved to be a decisive factor in 
mobilizing popular support for both Glass-Steagall and the Securities 
Act of 1933.88 
B. Pecora’s Findings of Serious Abuses at National City and Chase 
Discredited the Universal Banking Concept 
 Pecora’s investigations of National City and Chase—the two 
largest U.S. banks, which also controlled the two largest securities 
affiliates—had great significance for the future of the banking and 
securities industries.  Pecora exposed a wide range of unsound 
financial practices, deceptive conduct, conflicts of interest, and insider 
self-dealing at National City and Chase.  His findings discredited the 
leaders of both banks and turned public opinion against the financial-
department-store concept of universal banking.89 
 As shown below, National City and Chase encouraged 
unsophisticated investors to purchase risky securities through high-
pressure sales techniques and misleading prospectuses.  Both banks 
used stock pools and other manipulative techniques to promote the sale 
and boost the price of their own stocks as well as stocks of favored 
clients.  Both banks incurred large losses after making hazardous loans 
and investments to support the activities of their securities affiliates.  
Senior executives at both banks reaped extraordinary personal gains by 
exploiting their managerial positions. 
1. National City and Chase Sold Risky Securities Based on Offering 
Materials that Misled Investors 
 National City and Chase sold huge volumes of securities to their 
depositors, small correspondent banks, and other unsophisticated 
investors.90  As discussed above, National City and Chase built far-
flung branch networks to facilitate public distributions of securities 
that were issued by a wide range of domestic and foreign governments 
and business firms.91  The mass advertising and direct marketing 
programs used by National City and Chase encouraged investors to 
                                                 
 88. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 348-53, 368-71; PERINO, supra note 9, at 4-7, 208-11, 
221-26, 280-90; SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 2, 29-30, 37-38, 72. 
 89. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 328-35, 346-56, 370-72; PERINO, supra note 9, at 208-
11, 221-26, 280-83, 292; Peach, supra note 9, at 551-80.  
 90. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 135-53; Peach, 
supra note 9, at 525-35, 542-46; Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 565-66, 573-76, 592-93. 
 91. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (describing the magnitude of 
National City’s and Chase’s activities in underwriting and selling securities). 
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place their trust and confidence in the ability of both banks and their 
securities affiliates to select suitable investments for their customers.92  
As described below, that confidence proved to be tragically misplaced 
because many of the securities distributed by National City and Chase 
defaulted or plummeted in value during the early 1930s. 
 NCC’s marketing campaigns “assured prospective customers that 
if they saved, [NCC] would advise them how to invest.”93  One NCC 
advertisement warned investors that they “should not try to decide 
alone” and should instead rely on “the considered opinion of a world-
wide investment organization . . . .  National City judgment as to which 
bonds are best for you is based on both strict investigation of the 
security and analysis of your own requirements.”94  Another 
advertisement assured investors, “When you buy a bond recommended 
by [NCC], you may be sure that all the essential facts which justify 
[NCC’s] own confidence in that investment are readily available to 
you.”95 
 In his March 1919 lecture to National City’s and NCC’s trainees, 
Mitchell explained that small investors could not be expected to make 
informed decisions about bond investments.  He therefore declared 
that NCC owed a duty of trust and suitability in recommending 
securities to such investors: 
We have gained the confidence of the investor and we are building our 
institution upon that confidence.  We want the public to feel safe with 
us.  We are going to make more exacting our yard-stick, because the 
small investor who buys from us today a thousand or a five hundred 
dollar bond is not in a position to know whether that security is good or 
not and must rely on us. . . .  [W]e recognize that as between ourselves 
and this small investor, the law of caveat emptor cannot apply, and that 
if we are to fulfill our trust, we must supply that which means safety 
and a reasonable return to him.96 
 Unfortunately, as shown below, National City and NCC used 
marketing and sales techniques that were far removed from the 
concepts of trust and suitability articulated by Mitchell.  NCC’s 
headquarters office sent to its regional offices a steady stream of 
“flashes,” which contained sales recommendations and offers of cash 
                                                 
 92. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 135-39, 154, 
157-58; Peach, supra note 9, at 457-58, 466-67, 525-35. 
 93. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 137. 
 94. Id. at 138 fig.8.1 (reproducing an NCC advertisement). 
 95. PERINO, supra note 9, at 236 (quoting an NCC advertisement) (emphasis added). 
 96. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 139 (quoting 
Mitchell, supra note 48). 
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prizes and other incentives for good performance by sales 
representatives.97  National City and NCC also supplied hundreds of 
thousands of names of prospective customers (including National City 
depositors) to NCC’s sales force.98  Mitchell demanded a high level of 
production from NCC’s sales force.  He warned that NCC would not 
retain “any man in our sales crowd who would confess to his inability 
to sell at least some of any issue of either bonds or preferred stock that 
we think good enough to offer.”99 
 Many of the securities sold by National City and Chase proved to 
be disastrous investments for their customers.100  Two studies 
determined that securities underwritten by National City and Chase 
had higher default rates than securities underwritten by other banks.  
The first study, by James Ang and Terry Richardson, examined default 
histories for issues of domestic and foreign corporate bonds and 
foreign government bonds that were advertised in the Wall Street 
Journal from 1926 to 1930.  Ang and Richardson determined that the 
default rates for bonds underwritten by National City and Chase were 
higher compared with other commercial banks with securities 
affiliates; were much higher compared with the two leading private 
banks, J.P. Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; and were about the 
same as investment banks (securities firms).101 
 The second study, by Manju Puri, studied default records for 
domestic industrial bonds, preferred stock, and foreign government 
bonds that were issued in the United States from 1927 to 1929.  Puri 
determined that seven-year cumulative default rates for securities 
underwritten by National City and Chase were higher compared with 
nonbank underwriters as well as other commercial banks that 
                                                 
 97. PECORA, supra note 86, at 88-92; PERINO, supra note 9, at 198-200; SELIGMAN, 
supra note 9, at 24. 
 98. NCC’s “new business department” provided the names of more than 220,000 
prospective customers to NCC’s sales force between 1927 and 1929, with many of those 
names drawn from tax lists and automobile registration lists.  In addition, National City’s 
employees referred depositors who were interested in investments to NCC’s sales agents.  See 
Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2015-20 (statement of Hugh B. Baker); S. 
REP. NO. 73-1455, at 167 (1934). 
 99. SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 24-25 (quoting a telegraph that Mitchell sent). 
 100. See PERINO, supra note 9, at 135-36 (explaining that the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency “received hundreds of letters from former customers and investors [of 
National City], all with tales of ruin from following the bank’s advice,” and that many of the 
letter writers were “utterly devastated by investing with [National City] and . . . were barely 
hanging on as the economy tumbled into the abyss”). 
 101. See James S. Ang & Terry Richardson, The Underwriting Experience of 
Commercial Bank Affiliates Prior to the Glass-Steagall Act:  A Re-examination of Evidence 
for Passage of the Act, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 351, 355-59, 363-65, 385-86 (1994). 
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controlled securities affiliates.102  Defaults occurred on more than half 
of the securities issues that were underwritten by National City and 
Chase and included in the data sets constructed by Ang, Richardson, 
and Puri.103 
 As shown in the following summaries of transactions examined 
during the Pecora hearings, National City and Chase used materially 
misleading prospectuses to promote their sales of hazardous securities.  
In many cases, National City and Chase officials knew or should have 
known that their offering materials did not fairly disclose the very high 
investment risks inherent in those securities. 
a. NCC’s Sale of Peruvian bonds 
 NCC was part of the underwriting group for three issues of 
Peruvian bonds, totaling $90 million, which were sold to the public 
between March 1927 and October 1928.104  Before selling those bonds, 
                                                 
 102. See Manju Puri, The Long-Term Default Performance of Bank Underwritten 
Security Issues, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 397, 400-02, 404-07, 413, 415 (1994).  As I have 
discussed in a previous work, the general consensus among scholars is that the underwriting 
performance of commercial banks with securities affiliates during the 1920s was about the 
same as the underwriting performance of private banks and securities firms.  See Wilmarth, 
supra note 9, at 605-06 (indicating the similarities between the performances of commercial 
bank affiliates and traditional investment banks).  However, as I also pointed out, Congress 
did not base its decision to enact Glass-Steagall on any finding that bank securities affiliates 
had an inferior performance record as underwriters of securities.  Instead, Congress 
determined that (1) “the involvement of commercial banks in securities underwriting . . . 
promoted excessive competition within the underwriting business and encouraged both 
commercial banks and investment banks to abandon prudential standards and promote 
speculative, unsound issues,” (2) the hazards created by the involvement of commercial banks 
in securities activities could not be eliminated without requiring a complete separation 
between banks and securities firms, (3) securities firms should not be allowed to accept 
deposits in order to prevent those firms from using deposits to finance their underwriting and 
trading activities, and (4) it was feasible to adopt separate legislation (including the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) to prevent abusive underwriting and 
trading practices by securities firms.  Id. at 604, 606-07; see also Peach, supra note 9, at 577-
80, 605-15 (reaching the same conclusions). 
 103. See Ang & Richardson, supra note 101, at 364 tbl.3 (showing that twenty-nine 
bond issues defaulted of the fifty-six sovereign foreign bond issues underwritten by National 
City and Chase, for which the ultimate “fate” was known); Puri, supra note 102, at 403 tbl.1b 
(showing that eighteen securities issues defaulted of the thirty-three securities issues 
underwritten by National City and Chase).  Similarly, based on a data set of sovereign foreign 
bonds issued in New York between 1920 and 1929, another study found that twenty-seven of 
forty-five foreign bond issues underwritten by National City and Chase defaulted during the 
1930s.  See Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard & Ugo Panizza, Conflicts of Interest, 
Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis:  Banksters or Bad Luck? 12-15, 44 tbl.A (Graduate 
Inst. of Int’l & Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 02/2010, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1558402 (showing defaults on twenty-five of the forty-one National City bond issues and two 
of the four Chase issues). 
 104. See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 126-31 (1934). 
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National City and NCC received a series of highly negative reports on 
economic and political conditions in Peru.  A December 1921 report 
warned that Peru’s finances were “positively distressing” and that “the 
government treasury is flat on its back and gasping for breath.”105  A 
July 1923 report advised, “Peru has been careless in the fulfillment of 
[its] contractual obligations.”106  A December 1925 report cautioned, 
“[T]he internal debt of Peru has not yet been placed on a satisfactory 
footing.”107  At about the same time, a vice president of NCC wrote an 
internal memorandum describing Peru’s “bad-debt record” as well as 
its “adverse moral and political risk” and “bad internal debt 
situation.”108 
 In a July 1927 report sent to Mitchell, J.H. Durrell referred to 
Peru’s “uncertain” political situation as well as “factors that will long 
retard the economic importance of Peru.”109  Durrell also stated that he 
had “no great faith in any material betterment of Peru’s economic 
condition in the near future.”110  A March 1928 report advised that 
Peru’s “whole taxation system is a hodge-podge.”111  An October 1928 
report warned that “[e]conomic conditions in the country leave 
considerable to be desired” and that “local banks are still badly over 
extended,” while the Peruvian government’s “budget is not balanced 
and in fact the floating debt is larger than ever.”112 
                                                 
 105. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2053 (statement of Hugh B. 
Baker) (quoting Letter from C.W. Calvin, Representative, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., to J.T. 
Cosby, Vice President, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. (Dec. 9, 1921)). 
 106. Id. at 2058 (quoting Memorandum from C.M. Bishop, Emp., Foreign Dep’t, Nat’l 
City Bank of N.Y., to A.W. Dunham, Manager, Foreign Dep’t, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. (July 
12, 1923)). 
 107. Id. at 2061 (quoting a report dated December 16, 1925, authored by “E.A.K.”).  
Although National City received a somewhat more favorable report from C.W. Calvin in 
November 1925, National City decided not to participate in a loan to Peru in March 1926.  Id. 
at 2061-67. 
 108. Id. at 2065-66 (quoting an undated, handwritten memorandum prepared by Victor 
Schoepperle).  Victor Schoepperle was “a vice president of [NCC and] had devoted most of 
his time since 1919 to the company’s foreign financing.”  S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 127. 
 109. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2070-71 (statement of Hugh B. 
Baker) (quoting Letter from J.H. Durrell, Vice President & Overseas Manager, Nat’l City 
Bank of N.Y., to Charles E. Mitchell, President, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. (July 27, 1927)).  
Durrell was “a vice president and overseas manager of the National City Bank.”  S. REP. NO. 
73-1455, at 128-29. 
 110. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2071 (statement of Hugh B. 
Baker) (quoting Letter from J.H. Durrell to Charles E. Mitchell, supra note 109). 
 111. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 130 (quoting a report dated March 4, 1928, written by 
Frederick R. Kent). 
 112. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2113-14 (statement of Victor 
Schoepperle, Vice President, National City Co.) (quoting Memorandum from H.E. 
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 Notwithstanding the foregoing reports, the offering prospectuses 
distributed by National City and the other underwriters did not contain 
any references to Peru’s past defaults on its debts, its current economic 
problems, or the very weak condition of its government finances.113  
Peru defaulted on all three issues of bonds in 1931, and by 1933, the 
market values of those bonds had fallen by more than 90% since the 
dates of their issuance.114 
b. NCC’s Sale of Minas Gereas Bonds 
 In March 1928 and September 1929, NCC underwrote two issues 
of bonds, totaling $16.5 million, which were issued by the Brazilian 
state of Minas Gereas.115  NCC sold those bonds to the public after 
receiving highly adverse reports about the state’s creditworthiness.  A 
June 1927 report advised that “the laxness of the State authorities 
borders on the fantastic” and also warned about “the complete 
ignorance, carelessness and negligence of the former State officials in 
respect to external long-term borrowing.”116  In April 1928, after the 
first bond issue had been sold, NCC received another report, 
cautioning, “[T]here is a considerable degree of uneasiness on the part 
of all concerned over the question of the State’s willingness to meet its 
obligations.”117 
 In spite of those reports, NCC’s prospectuses for both issues of 
bonds stated, “Prudent and careful management of the State’s finances 
has been characteristic of successive administrations in Minas 
Gereas.”118  That statement appeared in both prospectuses, even though 
an NCC official warned that it would expose NCC to “criticism” in 
view of “the extremely loose way in which the external debt of the 
State was managed.”119 
                                                                                                             
Henneman, Assistant Vice President, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., to J.H. Durrell, Vice President 
& Overseas Manager, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. (Oct. 8, 1928)). 
 113. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 128-29, 131. 
 114. Id. at 126, 128-31; see also PERINO, supra note 9, at 234-37 (describing Pecora’s 
investigation of the Peruvian bond offerings). 
 115. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2132-33 (statement of Ronald 
M. Byrnes, Former Vice President, National City Co.). 
 116. Id. at 2155 (statement of George F. Train, Member, Foreign Department, National 
City Co.) (quoting Letter from George F. Train, Member, Foreign Dep’t, Nat’l City Co., to 
R.M. Byrnes, Vice President, Nat’l City Co. (June 12, 1927)). 
 117. Id. at 2152 (quoting Letter from George F. Train, Member, Foreign Dep’t, Nat’l 
City Co., to M.E. Squires, Acting Manager, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. (Apr. 27, 1928)). 
 118. Id. at 2156. 
 119. Id. at 2157 (quoting Letter from Samuel W. Baldwin, Treasurer, Nat’l City Co., to 
George F. Train, Member, Foreign Dep’t, Nat’l City Co. (Sept. 14, 1927)).  George Train 
testified that the statements in both prospectuses as to the “[p]rudent and careful management 
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 The prospectus for the second bond issue was also misleading 
because it did not disclose that almost half of the $8 million worth of 
proceeds would be used to pay off short-term loans that the 
underwriters had extended to Minas Gereas.  NCC’s underwriting 
group made those loans to Minas Gereas after the first bond issue 
failed to satisfy the state’s funding needs.120  As Pecora’s questioning 
also revealed, NCC’s underwriting group provided the loans in order to 
retain Minas Gereas’s loyalty at a time when Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and 
other underwriters were trying to attract the state’s future bond 
business.121 
 The prospectus for the second bond issue stated that “[t]he 
proceeds of this loan will be utilized for purposes designed to increase 
the economic productivity of the State” and would comply with “law 
No. 1061 of August 16, 1929.”122  The prospectus did not disclose that 
nearly half of the bond proceeds would be used to repay the short-term 
loans made by NCC’s underwriting group.123  Nor did it disclose that 
NCC’s Brazilian counsel had “drafted the law” (Law No. 1061) that 
allowed NCC’s underwriting group to recoup their loans from the bond 
proceeds.124  Minas Gereas defaulted on both bond issues in March 
1932.  By 1933, the market values of the bonds had fallen by more 
than three-quarters.125 
                                                                                                             
of the State’s finances” were intended to refer “only to the management of the State’s budget” 
and not to the handling of its “external financing.”  Id. at 2155-56.  He acknowledged, 
however, that “[i]t would have been more accurate” if the statements had referred only to the 
“internal” finances of Minas Gereas.  Id. at 2159.  He also admitted that he was “a little 
overenthusiastic with respect to the merits of the particular credit [he] was investigating.”  Id. 
at 2157. 
 120. Id. at 2135-36 (statement of Ronald M. Byrnes); id. at 2160-63 (statement of 
George F. Train). 
 121. PERINO, supra note 9, at 248-50, 252-53. 
 122. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2133 (statement of Ronald M. 
Byrnes) (quoting a prospectus dated September 16, 1929). 
 123. Id. at 2137.  Byrnes asserted, “[T]here is no investor that I know of who would 
have had the slightest interest, or whose judgment would have been in the least affected, by 
the fact that the moneys from this loan were to be used to pay [the underwriters’] advances 
. . . .”  Id. 
 124. Id. at 2135; see also PERINO, supra note 9, at 249 (commenting that NCC 
“dictated the content of a Minas Gereas law in order to ensure the legality of paying itself 
back with the proceeds of the bonds [NCC] was offering to American investors”). 
 125. See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 131, 133 (1934). 
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c. National City’s Sale of Stock To Finance a Disguised 
Bailout of Its Nonperforming Cuban Loans 
 Along with Chase and other large New York banks, National City 
made a disastrous foray into the Cuban sugar industry during World 
War I.  The market price for Cuban sugar skyrocketed during the war 
and its immediate aftermath, due in large part to the disruption of beet 
sugar production in Europe.  National City opened branches across 
Cuba and made extensive loans and investments in Cuba that equaled 
80% of its capital in 1921.126 
 The revival of European beet sugar production after the war led to 
a collapse of the price for Cuban sugar.  Many Cuban sugar producers 
defaulted on their bank loans, and National City’s Cuban branches 
were left with more than $60 million worth of nonperforming loans in 
1921.127  Mitchell organized General Sugar Corporation (General 
Sugar) in 1922 to take control of National City’s foreclosed Cuban 
properties in order to bring those properties back into operation.128 
 The Cuban sugar industry failed to recover after 1922, and 
National City still held more than $30 million worth of nonperforming 
Cuban loans on its books in 1927.  National bank examiners 
repeatedly criticized those loans.129  To solve this urgent problem, 
National City sold $50 million worth of newly issued stock to its 
shareholders in 1927.  Half of those funds were contributed to National 
City’s capital, and the other half were added to NCC’s capital.130  NCC 
immediately invested its $25 million of new funds in General Sugar, 
and General Sugar then paid $21 million in cash and $11 million in 
                                                 
 126. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 105-06; see also 
J.T.W. HUBBARD, FOR EACH, THE STRENGTH OF ALL:  A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK 181-85 (1995) (discussing the roles of National City and other banks in financing 
Cuba’s development); Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1792-93 (statement of 
Charles E. Mitchell) (stating that National City made “very large loans” to support the Cuban 
sugar business). 
 127. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1792-93 (statement of Charles 
E. Mitchell); CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 105-06; 
HUBBARD, supra note 126, at 185. 
 128. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1789-93 (statement of Charles 
E. Mitchell); CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 108-09; see 
also HUBBARD, supra note 126, at 185 (describing National City’s ownership of extensive 
foreclosed properties in Cuba, including railroads, sugar mills, and sugar plantations). 
 129. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1793-95, 1798-99, 1835 
(statement of Charles E. Mitchell); CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra 
note 15, at 109. 
 130. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1788-89 (statement of Charles 
E. Mitchell). 
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notes to National City to acquire the bank’s portfolio of delinquent 
Cuban loans.131 
 Thus, the General Sugar transaction “neatly excised the Cuban 
debt from [National City’s] books and placed it in [NCC], with the 
bank’s shareholders picking up the tab.”132  The shareholders who 
bought the $50 million of newly issued National City stock in 1927 
were not told that half of their investment would be used to finance 
General Sugar’s acquisition of National City’s delinquent Cuban 
loans.133  When pressed on that point by Pecora, Mitchell replied, “I 
hardly think there was any necessity [for such disclosure].”134  
However, as Michael Perino has pointed out:  “Mitchell was clearly 
using [NCC] to obscure [National City’s] mistakes, both to outsiders 
and to the bank’s own shareholders.  As Mitchell confided to one of his 
bond salesmen, ‘We wash our dirty linen on the back porch rather than 
on the front porch.’”135 
d. NCC’s Sale of Lautaro Nitrate Co. Bonds 
 In August 1929, NCC led an underwriting group that sold $32 
million of convertible bonds issued by Lautaro Nitrate Co. (LNC), the 
largest producer of sodium nitrate fertilizer in Chile.136  Before the 
bonds were issued, NCC sent Sterling Bunnell, an engineer, to study 
the Chilean sodium nitrate industry.  Bunnell informed NCC that the 
Chilean nitrate industry was threatened by increasing competition 
from synthetic nitrate produced in Europe and the United States.  In 
addition, the sale of Chilean nitrate to foreign markets was hindered by 
a high export duty imposed by the Chilean government.137  Bunnell 
advised NCC that the “unknown factor is obsolescence” with respect 
to the future profitability of Chilean nitrate, and “it is impossible to 
prophesy the conditions which may exist in the Chilean nitrate 
industry within the 25-year term of [the] new [bond] financing.”138  
Bunnell concluded that highly uncertain conditions in Chilean and 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 1789-97.  General Sugar eventually paid about $2 million of the notes it 
issued to National City.  Id. at 1795.  NCC subsequently wrote down its entire investment in 
General Sugar to $1.  Id. 
 132. PERINO, supra note 9, at 160. 
 133. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1796-97, 1833-34 (statement of 
Charles E. Mitchell). 
 134. Id. at 1833. 
 135. PERINO, supra note 9, at 161. 
 136. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2298-99, 2310-11 (statement of 
Ronald M. Byrnes). 
 137. Id. at 2317-19. 
 138. Id. at 2320-21 (quoting a report written by Bunnell, dated August 10, 1929). 
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world markets for nitrate made the proposed bond offering 
“speculative” from “the banking viewpoint.”139 
 NCC’s prospectus for LNC’s bonds did not refer to Bunnell’s 
study or his analysis of the competitive threat posed by synthetic 
nitrate.140  The prospectus also did not disclose a significant conflict of 
interest on NCC’s part.  A few months earlier, NCC had underwritten a 
$30 million bond offering by American I.G. Chemical Co. (AIGC).  
AIGC owned I.G. Farbenindustrie, a major producer of European 
synthetic nitrate that competed directly with LNC’s Chilean nitrate.141  
LNC’s bonds defaulted, and the market value of those bonds fell by 
more than 95% by 1933.142 
e. CSC’s Sale of Cuban Bonds 
 Like National City, Chase suffered large losses after making an 
ill-considered foray into Cuba.  Chase and CSC arranged a complex 
series of financings for Cuba between 1927 and 1930.  In February 
1927, Chase and Blair & Co. (Blair) extended $10 million worth of 
loans to support a new Cuban public works program.143  In June 1928, 
Chase, Blair, and two other banks provided $30 million of additional 
loans to Cuba, and a CSC-led underwriting group sold $20 million of 
Cuban bonds to the public.144 
 In February 1930, CSC’s underwriting group agreed to make a 
second public offering of $40 million of Cuban bonds, and the Chase-
led banking group promised to provide $20 million of additional loans 
to Cuba.  In return, Cuba agreed that the proceeds of the second bond 
offering could be used to pay off the $40 million of loans that Chase’s 
banking group had previously extended to Cuba.145  Thus, as a practical 
matter, the banks and underwriters used the 1930 bond offering to shift 
$40 million worth of sovereign credit risk from the banks to public 
investors.146 
                                                 
 139. Id. at 2320 (quoting a report written by Bunnell, dated August 10, 1929). 
 140. Id. at 2319-21. 
 141. Id. at 2321-23. 
 142. See id. at 2299, 2309. 
 143. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 134 (1934). 
 144. Id. at 134-35.  The banking group sold $20 million of bonds (“serial certificates”) 
to investors in two equal installments in October 1928 and January 1929.  Id. 
 145. Id. at 138; Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2711-12, 2714-16 (statement 
of Shepard Morgan, Vice President, Chase National Bank of the City of New York); id. at 
2747-48 (statement of A.M. Williams, Counsel, Rushmore, Bisbee & Stern). 
 146. Peach, supra note 9, at 574-75. 
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 In order to attract and retain Cuba’s business, CSC’s underwriting 
group paid large amounts of fees to friends and business associates of 
Cuba’s president, Gerardo Machado.  In addition, Chase made 
substantial loans to President Machado and his business firms, as well 
as his friends, associates, and other key Cuban officials.147  Chase’s 
Havana branch employed José Obrégón, the son-in-law of President 
Machado, even though Chase officials believed that “from any 
business standpoint,” Obrégón was “perfectly useless.”148  The 
prospectuses for the 1928 and 1930 Cuban bond offerings did not 
disclose to investors the special accommodations that Chase and CSC 
had provided to influential Cubans.149 
 The prospectuses for the Cuban bonds indicated that Cuba’s 
government had generated significant budget surpluses for several 
years when, in fact, the government ran a net deficit.150  The 
prospectuses also misled investors by stating that Cuba would create a 
“special account” into which designated revenues would be deposited 
each year to ensure repayment of the bonds.151  Cuba established an 
“accounting fund” for the designated revenues, but Chase learned in 
1929 that Cuba was comingling the designated revenues with general 
funds and planned to use designated revenues to meet its general 
operating expenses.152 
 The prospectus for the 1930 bond offering did not disclose that 
Cuba’s government had run a budget deficit of more than $7.4 million 
                                                 
 147. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2630-48 (statement of Adam K. Geiger, 
Second Vice President, Chase National Bank of the City of New York); S. REP. NO. 73-1455, 
at 215; PECORA, supra note 86, at 164-65. 
 148. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2630-31 (statement of Adam K. Geiger) 
(quoting Letter from James Bruce, Vice President, Chase Nat’l Bank of the City of N.Y., to 
Joseph Rovensky, Vice President, Chase Nat’l Bank of the City of N.Y. (Feb. 23, 1931)); 
accord PECORA, supra note 86, at 165-66. 
 149. See Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2812-13 committee exhibit 54 
(reprinting the prospectus for the $40 million of bonds offered to the public in February 
1930). 
 150. The 1928 and 1930 prospectuses each stated that during the previous five-year 
period, the “ordinary revenues” of Cuba’s government exceeded its “ordinary expenditures” 
by more than $22 million.  In contrast, the underwriters’ application to list Cuban bonds on 
the NYSE in 1930 disclosed that the expenditures of Cuba’s government for the four fiscal 
years preceding June 30, 1928, exceeded the government’s revenues by about $4 million.  S. 
REP. NO. 73-1455, at 135.  Cuba’s Secretary of the Treasury provided the misleading figures 
that appeared in Chase’s prospectuses, and Chase “did not go back of those figures.”  Senate 
Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2668 (statement of Shepard Morgan). 
 151. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 135-36.  The designated revenues included gasoline taxes 
and sales of automobile license plates, which Cuba’s new public works program was expected 
to stimulate by building a central highway across Cuba.  Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 
60, at 2548-49 (statement of Shepard Morgan). 
 152. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 136-38. 
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during its most recent fiscal year.153  The prospectus also did not 
include the $40 million of outstanding bank loans when it stated that 
Cuba’s “total funded debt” was $87 million.154  As a result, the 
prospectus created the misleading impression that the 1930 bond 
offering would reduce Cuba’s “total funded debt” by $40 million.  In 
fact, however, Cuba’s debt remained the same:  the $40 million of new 
bonded debt replaced the bank debt, which was repaid from the bond 
proceeds.155 
 After receiving additional short-term advances from Chase’s 
banking group, Cuba paid off the 1928 bonds.156  However, in 1933, 
Cuba defaulted on the 1930 bonds, and Cuba also failed to pay the $20 
million loan that Chase’s banking group extended in March 1931.157 
f. CSC’s Sale of Detroit & Canada Tunnel Co. Securities 
 In May 1928, a CSC-led underwriting group sold to the public 
$17 million of first mortgage bonds and convertible debentures issued 
by the Detroit & Canada Tunnel Co. (DCTC).  DCTC was organized 
in 1927 to build a two-lane vehicle tunnel between downtown Detroit, 
Michigan, and Windsor, Canada.158  The bond prospectus cited reports 
from three engineering firms, which estimated that revenues from the 
tunnel would easily cover the required debt service on the bonds 
during the first five years of the tunnel’s existence.159 
 The bond prospectus did not disclose that one of the engineering 
firms had a material conflict of interest.  That firm received a stock 
bonus valued at $250,000, which likely would not have been paid if the 
                                                 
 153. Id. at 140.  A Chase officer asserted that the Cuban government’s $7.4 million 
deficit during its fiscal year that ended June 30, 1929, was “not necessarily a material figure,” 
and it was therefore “a matter of choice” for Chase to omit that information from the 1930 
bond prospectus.  Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2717 (statement of Shepard 
Morgan). 
 154. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 141-42. 
 155. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2748-51 (statements of Shepard Morgan 
and A.M. Williams). 
 156. Id. at 2762-63, 2798 (statement of Shepard Morgan) (stating that the Chase 
underwriting group provided three short-term loans and purchased $867,000 of bonds to 
enable Cuba to pay off the 1928 bonds between 1931 and 1933). 
 157. Id. at 2772-73 (stating that the $20 million bank loan became “past due” in 
March 1933); S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 142-43 (stating that Cuba failed to pay the required 
interest on the $40 million of 1930 bonds that became due in June 1933); ILSE MINTZ, 
DETERIORATION IN THE QUALITY OF FOREIGN BONDS ISSUED IN THE UNITED STATES 1920-1930, 
at 29-30 (1951) (referring to Cuba’s default on its “external obligations” in 1933). 
 158. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 3890-92, 3906, 3915-16 (statement of 
Leslie W. Snow, Second Vice President, Chase National Bank of the City of New York). 
 159. Id. at 3940-41 committee exhibit 202 (reprinting a bond prospectus dated May 1, 
1928). 
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firm had issued an unfavorable report on the tunnel’s prospects.160  The 
prospectus also stated that the underwriters “recommend[ed] these 
bonds for investment,” even though the tunnel would face significant 
competition from two existing ferry companies as well as a new five-
lane bridge that was scheduled to open a year before the tunnel was 
completed.161 
 The revenues from DCTC’s tunnel fell far short of projections, 
and DCTC incurred a net loss of $1.8 million during 1931.162  DCTC 
defaulted on its debentures in November 1931 and on its first 
mortgage bonds in 1932.163  By 1933, the bonds had lost more than 
90% of their value and the debentures were worthless.164 
g. CSC’s Sale of Lincoln Building Securities 
 In May 1928, a CSC-led underwriting group offered to the public 
$16 million of mortgage bonds and $5.5 million of debentures issued 
by the Lincoln Forty-Second Street Corporation (LFSC).  LFSC was 
organized in 1928 to construct a new fifty-three-story office building 
on 42nd Street in New York City.165  The prospectuses for both public 
offerings declared that the new Lincoln Building would be “one of the 
tallest and most imposing structures in the city” and “one of the finest 
office buildings in the country.”166  The prospectuses also assured 
investors that “demand for high grade office building space and for 
shops and stores in this very accessible location has been definitely 
established.”167  The prospectuses projected that future rental revenues 
would easily cover the annual debt service on both the bonds and 
debentures.168 
                                                 
 160. See id. at 3958-59, 3961-63 (statement of Judson Bradway, Former President, 
Detroit & Canada Tunnel Co.). 
 161. Id. at 3940-41 committee exhibit 202 (reprinting a bond prospectus dated May 1, 
1928); id. at 3911-12 (statement of Leslie W. Snow).  A month before DCTC’s public offering 
occurred, representatives of the bridge company met with representatives of DCTC and 
argued that their five-lane bridge would be “superior” to DCTC’s proposed two-lane tunnel.  
Id. at 3913-14. 
 162. Id. at 3933-34 (statement of Harry M. Addinsell, Former Officer, Harris, Forbes 
& Co.). 
 163. Id. at 3927 (statement of Leslie W. Snow). 
 164. See id. at 3917. 
 165. Id. at 4050-52, 4058-64. 
 166. Id. at 4072-74 committee exhibit 217, 4077-78 committee exhibit 219 (reprinting 
prospectuses for the first mortgage bonds and for the debentures). 
 167. Id. at 4072-74 committee exhibit 217. 
 168. See id. (reprinting the prospectus for the first mortgage bonds); id. at 4077-78 
committee exhibit 219 (reprinting the prospectus for the debentures). 
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 The prospectuses did not disclose that two members of Chase’s 
board of directors had opposed CSC’s involvement in the Lincoln 
building project or that a Chase officer had questioned the project’s 
viability.169  CSC’s underwriting group had difficulty selling both the 
bonds and the debentures, and the underwriters were obliged to 
purchase more than $400,000 of the bonds and almost $3.8 million of 
the debentures.170 
 Due to decreased demand for office space in New York City after 
the stock market crash, the Lincoln Building leased only about half of 
its offices.171  In January 1931, CSC issued an updated prospectus for 
the first mortgage bonds, which represented that the Lincoln Building 
had rented 60% of its offices.  CSC knew that representation was not 
true.172  The 1931 prospectus also provided a higher valuation for the 
Lincoln Building than either of the estimated values contained in the 
1928 prospectus, even though commercial real estate values had 
declined in New York City since 1928.173 
 LFSC defaulted on both its bonds and debentures, and the 
bondholders began foreclosure proceedings in January 1932.  At the 
foreclosure sale in July 1933, CSC made the highest bid and purchased 
the Lincoln Building for $4.75 million.174  LFSC’s bondholders lost 
more than 60% of their investments, and LFSC’s debenture holders 
lost all of their investments.175 
                                                 
 169. Id. at 4062 (statement of Leslie W. Snow); id. at 4099-4100 (statement of George 
Ramsey, Investment Banker, Chase Harris Forbes Corporation). 
 170. Id. at 4061, 4063-64, 4084 (statement of Leslie W. Snow). 
 171. Id. at 4058; id. at 4100-03 (statement of George Ramsey). 
 172. Id. at 4102-03 (statement of George Ramsey); see id. at 4136-37 committee 
exhibit 231 (reprinting the updated prospectus dated January 12, 1931). 
 173. The 1928 prospectus cited reports from two real estate companies, which 
assigned estimated values of $25.2 million and $25.9 million to the planned Lincoln 
Building.  The 1931 prospectus cited a 1930 report from one of those companies, which 
estimated that the completed building was worth $26.7 million.  The building’s actual cost 
was $24.6 million.  See id. at 4073 committee exhibit 217 (reprinting the 1928 prospectus); 
id. at 4103-04 (statement of Leslie W. Snow); id. at 4137 committee exhibit 231 (reprinting 
the 1931 prospectus). 
 174. Id. at 4056-58 (statement of Leslie W. Snow); id. at 4106 (statement of George 
Ramsey). 
 175. Bondholders who deposited their bonds with the bondholders’ protective 
committee received income debentures after the foreclosure sale.  Those income debentures 
had a market value of less than 40% of par in November 1933.  Bondholders who did not 
deposit their bonds with the protective committee received $337 in cash for each $1,000 of 
bonds they owned.  See id. at 4057, 4084-85 (statement of Leslie W. Snow). 
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2. National City and Chase Manipulated the Prices of Their Own 
Stocks and Stocks of Favored Clients 
 National City and Chase organized marketing campaigns and 
trading pools to pump up the market prices of their own stocks, as well 
as the stocks of favored corporate clients.  Their manipulative 
techniques artificially inflated market prices for the targeted stocks, 
encouraged the public to invest in those stocks, and inflicted massive 
losses on investors when the stock prices later collapsed. 
a. National City’s Promotion of Its Own Stock 
 National City delisted its stock from the NYSE in January 1928 
and moved the stock to the over-the-counter market, where NCC could 
more easily control trading in the stock.176  NCC then launched a 
massive campaign to promote the sale of National City’s stock to the 
public.177  By the end of 1930, NCC had sold almost two million shares 
of National City stock, for which investors paid about $650 million.178  
The number of National City’s shareholders rose from less than 16,000 
in 1927 to almost 80,000 in 1931.179 
 National City wanted to attract more stockholders in order to 
create “more business opportunities” and more “prospective 
customers” for financial services offered by National City and for 
investments offered by NCC.180  National City arranged a 5-1 stock 
split in February 1929 in order to reduce the market price of its stock 
                                                 
 176. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1919-24, 1970 (statement of 
Hugh B. Baker); PERINO, supra note 9, at 181-82.  NYSE rules during the 1920s prohibited 
corporations from becoming members of the NYSE.  Consequently, corporations could not 
trade NYSE-listed stocks except through brokers who were members of the NYSE.  Sissoko, 
supra note 2, at 10-11.  By virtue of its status as a corporation, NCC could not directly trade 
National City’s stock as long as that stock was listed on the NYSE. 
 177. In carrying out its marketing campaign for National City stock, NCC typically 
bought shares of National City stock in the open market, either directly or through brokers, 
and then sold those shares directly to investors.  Senate National City Hearings, supra note 
20, at 1884 (statement of Gordon S. Rentschler, President, National City Bank of New York); 
id. at 1890-92, 1919 (statement of Hugh B. Baker).  National City provided short-term loans 
to brokers to finance their purchases of National City stock until the brokers could deliver the 
stock to NCC.  Id. at 1971-80; id. at 1983-85, 1989-97 (statement of Charles E. Mitchell). 
 178. Id. at 1879-81 (statement of Gordon S. Rentschler) (confirming the amount and 
value of National City stock that NCC sold to investors between July 1927 and December 
1930); see also id. at 1938-1940 (statement of Hugh B. Baker) (describing the rise in the 
number of National City shareholders). 
 179. Id. at 1940 (statement of Hugh B. Baker). 
 180. Id. at 1938; see also PERINO, supra note 9, at 179 (explaining that NCC “intensely 
marketed [National City] stock to the public, not only to raise the price of the stock, but 
because broad stock ownership benefited the bank”).  “Stockholders became just another 
group to whom the bank could cross-sell its other financial products.”  Id. 
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so that it would be “within the reach of the smaller investor.”181  
National City depositors who expressed an interest in buying 
investments were frequently encouraged to buy National City stock.182 
 NCC’s selling campaign helped to boost National City’s stock 
price from $780 per share in January 1928 to $2,900 per share in the 
fall of 1929 (adjusted for the 5-1 stock split).  National City’s stock 
price fell to $200 per share in early 1933 (similarly adjusted), 
representing a loss of more than 90% for investors who bought at the 
market peak.183 
 National City established a stock-purchase program for its high-
ranking officers in February 1927, not long before National City’s 
stock price began its remarkable ascent.  In December 1929, after the 
stock price had fallen from its peak by about two-thirds, National City 
established a stock-purchase program for its ordinary employees.  
Employees bought 60,000 shares of National City stock at prices 
ranging from $1,000 to $1,100 (adjusted for the 5-1 stock split), and 
many bought their stock under a four-year plan that deducted 
installment payments (with interest) from their paychecks.184 
 As National City’s stock price continued to decline after the stock 
market crash, National City provided shockingly disparate treatment to 
its senior officers and ordinary employees.  The bank extended $2.4 
million of no-interest loans in November 1929 to boost the “morale” 
of a hundred of its top executives who were struggling to hold onto 
their National City stock despite margin calls.  Those executives repaid 
only 5% of their “morale” loans, and National City transferred the 
other 95% to NCC in December 1930, where the loans were either 
written off or not enforced.185 
 In sharp contrast, National City rigorously enforced the 
installment stock-purchase contracts that its ordinary employees signed 
                                                 
 181. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1940 (statement of Hugh B. 
Baker). 
 182. Id. at 2019-21. 
 183. See id. at 1921-23. 
 184. PERINO, supra note 9, at 168-71.  For descriptions of the 1927 and 1929 stock-
purchase plans, see PECORA, supra note 86, at 128-29.  As Perino points out, National City 
established its employee stock-purchase plan at a time when NCC held a large block of 
National City stock following the collapse of National City’s proposed merger with the Corn 
Exchange Bank.  See PERINO, supra note 9, at 169-71.  Perino suggests that National City’s 
leadership probably thought that “[p]utting the stock in the hands of the employees rather 
than selling it back into the market would . . . take additional downward pressure off the 
[price of National City] stock.”  Id. at 171. 
 185. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1868-72, 1875 (statement of 
Gordon S. Rentschler).  For further discussion of National City’s “morale” loans for senior 
executives, see PECORA, supra note 86, at 127-28, and PERINO, supra note 9, at 166-68. 
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in December 1929, and many of those employees were still paying off 
their loans in 1933.  At that point, the obligations of many employees 
under their installment contracts were far greater than the value of their 
National City shares.186  One newspaper commented that National 
City’s forgiveness of “morale” loans for its senior executives could not 
be squared with its harsh treatment of ordinary employees:  “[T]he 
clerks of the bank, who had been urged, and in some cases really 
driven, to purchasing the bank stock . . . lest they lose the favor of their 
superior officers, were given . . . no aid whatsoever by the bank in 
carrying the shares they bought . . . .  No moratorium for them!  No 
loans to help them carry on!”187 
b. Chase’s Trading in Its Own Stock 
 Chase’s program for boosting its stock price was at least as 
aggressive as National City’s and produced similarly disastrous results 
for investors who bought Chase shares at the stock market’s peak in 
1929.  Like National City, Chase delisted its stock from the NYSE in 
January 1928, and CSC thereafter purchased and sold Chase stock in 
the over-the-counter market.188  Also, like National City, Chase 
arranged a 5-1 split of its stock in 1929 in order to reduce its market 
price and make possible a “wider distribution” of Chase stock to small 
investors.189 
 CSC organized eight trading pools for Chase stock between 
September 1927 and July 1931.  Those trading pools bought and sold 
$860 million of Chase stock, relying in part on loans provided by 
Chase.190  Boosted by this massive trading program, the market price of 
Chase stock rose from $575 per share in 1927 to $1,325 per share in 
1929 (adjusted for the 5-1 stock split), before falling to $89 per share 
in 1933 (similarly adjusted).191  Thus, Chase’s large-scale trading in its 
own stock was comparable to National City’s campaign, and Chase 
                                                 
 186. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1872-75 (statement of Gordon S. 
Rentschler).  For further discussion of National City’s enforcement of the installment 
purchase contracts of ordinary employees, see PECORA, supra note 86, at 128-29; PERINO, 
supra note 9, at 168-69; and S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 172 (1934). 
 187. PERINO, supra note 9, at 187 (quoting Editorial, The National City Bank Scandal, 
NATION, Mar. 8, 1933, at 247. 
 188. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2373-79 (statement of Albert H. 
Wiggin).  CSC frequently bought and sold Chase stock through its subsidiary, Metpotan 
Securities Corporation  Id. at 2378-79, 2414. 
 189. Id. at 2371-73 (describing Chase’s stock split in July 1929). 
 190. Id. at 2837-39 (statements of Albert H. Wiggin and Henry Hargreaves, Secretary, 
Chase Corporation); S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 174-81; PECORA, supra note 86, at 148-50. 
 191. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 174-75, 178, 183. 
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shareholders who purchased their stock at the 1929 market peak lost 
more than 90% of their investments, like their National City peers.192 
c. Trading Pools for Client Stocks 
 National City and Chase also arranged trading pools to boost the 
stock prices of favored clients.  For example, in late 1928 and early 
1929, NCC participated in three pools that traded in the stocks of a 
subsidiary of Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (Anaconda) and two other 
copper mining companies that Anaconda intended to acquire.  
Anaconda’s top two executives, John Ryan and Cornelius Kelley, also 
participated in those trading pools.  The purpose of the pools was to 
“facilitate” the planned conversion of the stocks of all three companies 
into Anaconda stock.193 
 In August 1929, after the pools had completed their trading and 
Anaconda had acquired the two mining companies, NCC launched a 
massive public sales campaign for Anaconda stock.  During the next 
two months, NCC sold over 1.3 million shares of Anaconda stock to 
the public at a price of about $120 per share.  NCC pursued its 
Anaconda sales campaign despite NCC’s knowledge that the market 
price of copper had recently fallen from twenty-four cents to eighteen 
cents per pound.  By 1933, Anaconda’s stock price had plunged to $7 
per share, more than 90% below the price at which NCC marketed 
Anaconda’s stock to the public.194 
 In October 1928, CSC participated in purchasing and trading 
syndicates for the stock of Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation 
(Sinclair).  Sinclair’s chief executive, Harry Sinclair, and several other 
officers and directors of Sinclair also participated in the syndicates.  
The two syndicates bought and sold about 2.5 million shares of 
Sinclair stock and earned total profits of more than $12.2 million.  
Chase provided a $12 million short-term loan to assist the purchasing 
syndicate in buying Sinclair stock.195  The syndicates sold Sinclair 
stock to the public at a price of about $38 per share. However, by 1933, 
the stock price had fallen by more than two-thirds, to $12 per share.196 
                                                 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 183, 191 (describing declines of more than 
90% in the stock prices of National City and Chase between 1929 and 1933). 
 193. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 166-67. 
 194. See id. at 167-68; Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1854-55, 
1862-66 (statement of Charles E. Mitchell). 
 195. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 63-66; see also PECORA, supra note 86, at 169-76 
(describing the Sinclair pool operations). 
 196. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 3340-41 (statement of Elisha Walker, 
Member, Kuhn, Loeb & Co.). 
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 From 1928 to 1932, CSC participated in more than thirty other 
trading pools beyond those dealing in Chase stock and Sinclair stock.197  
In Pecora’s view, CSC’s trading pools “were simply raiding expeditions 
on the market in the spirit of the times” and reflected CSC’s 
willingness to exploit “the speculative frenzy . . . for its own profit.”198 
3. National City and Chase Made Unsound Loans and Investments 
To Support Their Securities Affiliates 
 The Pecora hearings showed that National City and Chase closely 
coordinated the activities of their banks and securities affiliates so that 
each bank and affiliate operated together as a unified business.  
Mitchell acknowledged that National City was “inseparably 
interwoven” with NCC and that the two companies acted together as 
one “institutional entity.”199  Hugh Baker, NCC’s President, admitted 
that National City helped NCC and that NCC helped National City “all 
the time.”200  Similarly, as Pecora observed with regard to Chase, 
“[T]he intimate connection, amounting to practical identity, between 
the Chase Bank proper and its security affiliate did not differ, except in 
details, from the National City model.”201 
 National City and Chase frequently made loans to support the 
securities-underwriting and -trading activities of their securities 
affiliates.  From time to time, NCC borrowed up to the legal limit of 
$20 million from National City.202  National City also made loans to 
brokers to facilitate NCC’s purchases of National City stock.203  In 
addition, National City extended loans to many of NCC’s customers.  
In 1930 and 1931, National City carried on its books $80 million of 
“bridge” loans that the bank had made to customers of NCC in 
anticipation of securities offerings that NCC could not complete after 
the stock market crashed.204 
 In June 1932, Chase held $130 million worth of loans and 
investments related to CSC’s securities activities, while CSC held $34 
                                                 
 197. Id. at 2858-59 committee exhibit 74. 
 198. PECORA, supra note 86, at 184-85. 
 199. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1995 (statement of Charles E. 
Mitchell). 
 200. Id. at 1939 (statement of Hugh B. Baker). 
 201. PECORA, supra note 86, at 138. 
 202. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 1879 (statement of Gordon S. 
Rentschler) (acknowledging that NCC sometimes borrowed amounts from National City that 
were equal to the “entire amount” of the bank’s unsecured lending limit, which was 
approximately $20 million). 
 203. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 204. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 171. 
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million worth of investments in its clients’ securities.205  As discussed 
above, a Chase-led banking group provided $60 million of loans to 
support the public sale of $60 million of Cuban bonds by CSC’s 
underwriting group.  In 1933, Cuba defaulted on $20 million of those 
bank loans, and Chase was left holding $9.7 million of delinquent 
Cuban loans.206 
 The most disastrous foray by Chase and CSC was their joint 
effort to reorganize and refinance General Theatres Equipment, Inc. 
(GTE), and Fox Film Corporation (Fox).  A detailed discussion of that 
debacle is beyond the scope of this Article.  It is sufficient to point out 
that Chase had made $77 million of loans by October 1933 to GTE 
and Fox and wrote off more than $55 million worth of those loans, 
while CSC wrote off virtually all of the $14 million CSC invested in 
GTE and Fox securities.207 
4. Senior Executives of National City and Chase Received 
Extraordinary Compensation and Gains from Self-Dealing 
 Pecora’s investigation revealed that the top executives of National 
City and Chase received extraordinary benefits and engaged in abusive 
insider transactions.  National City’s chairman, Mitchell, received 
salaries and bonuses totaling $3.5 million from 1927 through 1929.  
The disclosure of Mitchell’s compensation in March 1933, at the 
Depression’s lowest point, triggered widespread public outrage.208 
 Mitchell received most of his compensation in the form of 
bonuses paid by National City and NCC.  Under each company’s 
bonus plan, the first 8% of annual net earnings were retained by the 
firm (i.e., the shareholders), and 20% of net earnings above the 8% 
level were paid into a “management fund.”  The management fund 
then distributed bonuses to qualifying senior executives.  Mitchell 
typically received about 40% of the bonuses paid from National City’s 
management fund and about 30% of the bonuses paid from NCC’s 
                                                 
 205. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2926 (statement of Albert H. Wiggin). 
 206. Id. at 2772-73, 2798-99 (statement of Shepard Morgan); see also supra Part 
III.B.1.e (describing the financing provided by Chase and CSC for Cuba’s public works 
program). 
 207. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 3644-45 committee exhibit 164.  For an 
overview of the GTE/Fox disaster and the losses incurred by Chase and CSC, see BARRIE A. 
WIGMORE, THE CRASH AND ITS AFTERMATH:  A HISTORY OF SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1929-1933, at 171-75, 220-21, 264, 332, 357 (1985). 
 208. S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 206 (1934); PERINO, supra note 9, at 147, 155-56; Harwell 
Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”:  The Fight over Executive Compensation 
in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 705-07, 713-15 (2010). 
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management fund.209  National City and NCC did not seek to recover 
the bonuses they had paid during the boom when they later suffered 
massive losses after the stock market crashed.210 
 National City’s and NCC’s bonus plans created perverse 
incentives that encouraged Mitchell and his senior colleagues to 
pursue ever-greater risks.  As Pecora observed, the bonus plans made it 
“quite easy to understand the reckless, anything-for-a-profit mood in 
which the National City was operating.  The officers had nothing to 
gain and everything to lose, individually, by a conservative policy.”211  
The executives knew they would receive only their salary (typically 
$25,000 per year), without any bonus, if their company earned net 
profits of less than 8% per year, because all of that amount would go to 
the shareholders.  In contrast, they stood to collect one-fifth of any 
“superprofits” above 8%, and “there was no possible risk of loss of 
their own money to deter them.”212 
 In Pecora’s view, National City and NCC gave their leaders “a 
gigantic, foolproof device for gambling freely with the stockholders’ 
money, taking huge profits when the gambles won, and risking not one 
penny of their own money if they lost.”213  Indeed, as noted above, 
National City provided interest-free “morale” loans to help its top 
executives after the stock market crashed, and National City 
subsequently forgave almost all of those loans.214 
 Mitchell and his colleagues secured additional self-dealing 
benefits by taking personal stakes in some of NCC’s securities deals.  
For example, in October 1928, NCC agreed to arrange a large sale of 
the common and preferred stock of Boeing Air Transport, Inc. 
(Boeing).  Instead of making a public offering, NCC sold the Boeing 
stock to a “preferred list” of purchasers, which included Boeing 
                                                 
 209. PERINO, supra note 9, at 143-49.  Baker, NCC’s president, received over $750,000 
of compensation from 1927 to 1929.  Like Mitchell, Baker received most of that amount 
through bonuses from NCC’s management fund.  See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 206-07. 
 210. For example, in July 1929, NCC paid interim bonuses to its top executives 
(including $500,000 to Mitchell) as “advances” based on profits that NCC earned during the 
first half of 1929.  However, NCC did not require Mitchell or other recipients to repay those 
“advances” after the stock market crashed in October and wiped out their bonus entitlements 
for the full year.  PERINO, supra note 9, at 148-49; S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 205-07. 
 211. PECORA, supra note 86, at 117. 
 212. Id. at 117-18; see also PERINO, supra note 9, at 143 (“[P]rofit sharing [for 
National City executives] did not kick in until the bank had crossed that initial 8 percent 
threshold.”). 
 213. PECORA, supra note 86, at 114. 
 214. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing National City’s “morale” 
loans). 
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insiders as well as Mitchell and a group of NCC’s “officers, key men, 
directors and special friends.”215 
 After completing that sale, NCC publicly advertised that it had 
sold a large block of Boeing stock to “our own family and certain 
officers and employees of [Boeing],” and NCC quickly arranged to list 
Boeing’s stock on the NYSE.216  NCC’s advertisement was “well 
calculated to excite the greatest public attention,” and Boeing’s stock 
price rose sharply as soon as the stock began to trade on the NYSE on 
November 2, 1928.217  The immediate rise in Boeing’s stock price 
produced potential profits of at least $1.6 million for the preferred list 
of insiders and friends of NCC and Boeing, including Mitchell.218 
 In January 1929, NCC made a second sale of Boeing’s stock, this 
time through a public offering.  In connection with that offering, NCC 
sold a block of Boeing stock to the same preferred list of insiders and 
friends (including Mitchell) at a price that was significantly below the 
public offering price.  Those on the preferred list once again received 
the opportunity to earn substantial immediate profits by selling their 
Boeing shares into the market.219 
 Albert Wiggin was the “active head and guiding spirit” of Chase 
and CSC, and he “dominated [both institutions] as overwhelmingly as 
. . . Mitchell dominated the National City.”220  Wiggin used his 
positions at Chase and CSC to reap personal rewards that exceeded 
even Mitchell’s gains.221  Chase and CSC paid Wiggin more than $1.3 
million in salary and bonuses between 1928 and 1932, and Chase did 
not require Wiggin to return any of his bonuses after Chase incurred 
                                                 
 215. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2327 (statement of Joseph P. 
Ripley, Vice President, National City Co.) (quoting Telegram from Charles E. Mitchell, 
President, Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., to Joseph P. Ripley, Vice President, Nat’l City Co. (Oct. 
22, 1928)); see also S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 107 (describing NCC’s “preferred list” for the 
sale of Boeing stock). 
 216. Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2332-33 (statement of Joseph P. 
Ripley) (quoting NCC’s sales “flash No. 3225,” dated November 1, 1928). 
 217. PECORA, supra note 86, at 125. 
 218. See id. at 125-26 (estimating profits of $1.6 to $2.4 million for NCC and 
potential profits of at least $1.63 million for the “preferred list” of purchasers for Boeing 
stock); Senate National City Hearings, supra note 20, at 2331, 2334-36 (statement of Joseph 
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massive losses.222  In fact, Chase’s board of directors voted to pay 
Wiggin a lifetime pension of $100,000 per year after he announced his 
retirement in December 1932, even though Chase and CSC were 
forced to set aside more than $330 million of reserves against losses 
between 1929 and 1933.223  Wiggin received substantial additional 
payments from directorships that he held in fifty-nine other 
companies.  Many of those companies were clients of Chase and 
received large loans from Chase.224 
 Wiggin received further self-dealing gains by arranging for his 
family-owned corporations to participate in many of the trading pools 
organized by CSC.  Wiggin thereby captured for his family’s benefit 
millions of dollars of profits that CSC could have earned.225  To ensure 
that CSC would acquiesce in those arrangements, Wiggin’s family 
corporations gave director positions, profit-sharing opportunities, and 
loans to several Chase and CSC officers, who reciprocated by 
approving the participation of Wiggin’s family corporations in the 
trading pools.226  For example, CSC’s massive trading operations in 
Chase stock produced net profits of only $160,000 for CSC between 
1928 and 1932, but Wiggin’s family corporations earned $10.4 million 
of profits from trading in Chase stock during the same period.227 
 Wiggin suffered probably the greatest public disgrace of any 
major bank executive during the Pecora hearings when Pecora forced 
Wiggin to admit that he sold Chase stock short during the stock 
market’s collapse in late 1929.  Wiggin’s family corporations made 
short sales of 42,506 Chase shares between September 23 and 
November 4, 1929, covered those short positions on December 11, 
1929, and earned net profits of $4 million.228  Wiggin did not inform 
Chase or CSC that he was selling short, and he knew that CSC was 
                                                 
 222. See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 208 (1934). 
 223. See id. at 209-10. 
 224. PECORA, supra note 86, at 145-46; S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 201-03. 
 225. PECORA, supra note 86, at 147-52. 
 226. Senate Chase Hearings, supra note 60, at 2849-54, 2889-94, 2901-05, 2932-40 
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actively buying Chase stock during the same time period.229  Wiggin 
even had the chutzpah to arrange for two of his family corporations to 
borrow the necessary funds from Chase so that they could make the 
necessary purchases of Chase stock to cover their short positions.230 
 Pecora’s exposure of Wiggin’s short selling “thoroughly destroyed 
[Wiggin’s] reputation.”231  Pecora also badly damaged Mitchell’s public 
standing when he forced Mitchell to admit that he had created a 
fictitious investment loss to shield himself from income tax liability 
for 1929.  Mitchell sold 18,300 shares of National City stock to his 
wife in late 1929 in order to create a tax loss of $2.8 million, and he 
bought back the same shares in early 1930.  Mitchell relied on the 
claimed tax loss to avoid paying any income tax on the $1.1 million of 
compensation he received in 1929.232  Mitchell’s admission stunned the 
public and created a “portrait of a greedy banker willing to use any 
artifice to hang on to every cent of his enormous salary.”233  Mitchell 
was tried and acquitted of criminal tax evasion, but he was obliged to 
pay $1.1 million in back taxes and civil penalties.234 
 In response to the public outrage triggered by Pecora’s 
revelations, Mitchell resigned as head of National City and NCC, 
while Wiggin, who had retired as head of Chase and CSC in December 
1932, renounced his lifetime pension.235  The reputations of Chase and 
National City followed the same downward spiral as those of their 
fallen leaders.  Mitchell’s and Wiggin’s successors, James Perkins and 
Winthrop Aldrich, announced in March 1933 that they would shut 
down the securities affiliates of National City and Chase, respectively.  
Those announcements provided further impetus for passage of Glass-
Steagall in June 1933.236 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 Pecora’s investigation of National City and Chase revealed 
fundamental flaws in the first-generation universal banking model of 
the 1920s.  National City and Chase were the two largest U.S. banks 
and operated the two largest and most important securities affiliates.  
Their performances are therefore highly relevant in considering the 
question of whether first-generation universal banks posed 
unacceptable risks to the banking system and the securities market. 
 As shown above in Part III.B, the evidence produced during the 
Pecora hearings supported Glass-Steagall’s premise that financial 
department stores created intolerable hazards that could not be 
resolved without dismantling the universal banking model.  Those 
dangers included the likelihood that a universal bank would mobilize 
its deposits, lending resources, and retail branches to underwrite and 
market high-risk securities to unsophisticated investors who trusted in 
the bank’s presumed soundness and investment expertise.237  The 
universal banking structure also created pervasive conflicts of interest 
that tempted the bank to (1) make speculative loans and investments to 
support its securities affiliate, (2) provide risky loans to investors to 
support their purchases of securities promoted by the affiliate, and 
(3) extend unsound loans to issuers of securities underwritten by the 
affiliate.238 
 Conversely, the universal banking model encouraged the 
securities affiliate to sell unsuitable, high-risk securities to the bank’s 
depositors and trust customers and to pump up the market price of the 
bank’s stock by actively trading in that stock.239  As Ron Chernow 
pointed out in a 1990 book, the universal banking model allowed 
banks to “take bad loans, repackage them as bonds, and fob them off 
on investors, as National City had done with Latin American loans.  
They could even lend investors the money to buy the bonds.”240  In 
addition, if Glass-Steagall had not been enacted, the new system of 
federal deposit insurance established in 1933 would have aggravated 
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the risks of universal banking by enabling banks to use subsidized, 
low-cost deposit funding to support their securities operations.241 
 Universal banks also generated higher levels of systemic risk by 
increasing the likelihood that problems in the banking system would 
spill over into the securities markets and vice versa.  Without Glass-
Steagall, as Chernow noted, universal banking would have “forced the 
Federal Reserve System to stand behind both depositors and 
speculators.  If a securities affiliate failed, the [Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System] might need to rescue it to protect the 
parent bank.  In other words, the government might have to protect 
speculators to save depositors.”242  To sever any links between deposit 
taking and the securities markets, Glass-Steagall barred banks from the 
securities business and also prohibited securities firms from accepting 
deposits.243 
 The dangers of universal banking described by Chernow in 1990 
were fully realized during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  Large 
universal banks played leading roles in originating and securitizing 
hazardous loans and in marketing high-risk, asset-backed securities 
and related derivatives, which helped to produce the greatest 
worldwide boom and crash since the Great Depression.  To prevent a 
systemic collapse of global financial markets, government officials in 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe rescued large, 
troubled universal banks and supported not just their banking units, but 
also their securities and other nonbanking subsidiaries.  Governments 
also arranged and financed emergency deals that created new universal 
banks (e.g., Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) and that enabled 
existing universal banks (e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank and Bank of 
America) to become even larger by acquiring troubled securities firms.  
As a result of those far-reaching government measures, we now have a 
too-big-to-fail policy that is widely believed to cover not just the 
banking system, but also large segments of the securities and insurance 
markets.244 
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 As policy makers ponder the need for additional financial 
reforms, they should reconsider the lessons of the Great Depression, as 
well as the wisdom of the financial regulatory regime created by 
Glass-Steagall and other New Deal measures.  For example, John Kay, 
a prominent British economist, has argued that the United States, 
United Kingdom, and other developed nations should establish 
regulatory regimes that create clear structural barriers (similar to those 
prescribed by Glass-Steagall) between traditional banking, securities 
underwriting and trading, and asset management.  Otherwise, he 
contends, we will never overcome the pervasive conflicts of interest, 
excessive risk taking, and systemic crises that are inevitable 
byproducts of financial systems dominated by universal banks.245  I 
intend to show in future work how we could accomplish a fundamental 
structural reform of our financial system along the lines advocated by 
Kay. 
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